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D. WAWANCARA

Pradipta. (2023, February 27). South Korea's New Southern Policy towards India. (Bubun, Interviewer)

LAMPIRAN
TRANSKRIP HASIL WAWANCARA
PENELITIAN SKRIPSI

A. Identitas Narasumber

Nama : Baskara Pradipta
NIP : 19680611994031000
Jabatan : Diplomat Ahli Madya & Koordinator Fungsi Kajian Kawasan
Asia Timur
Unit Kerja : Pusat Strategi Kebijakan Kawasan Asia-Pasifik dan Afrika,
Badan Strategi Kebijakan Luar Negeri, Kementerian Luar Negeri
Republik Indonesia

(Keterangan: P = Pewawancara, N = Narasumber)

B. Pelaksanaan Wawancara

Hari/Tanggal : Senin, 27 Februari 2022
Waktu : 10.00 WIB / 11.00 WITA – Selesai
Tempat : Kanal *Zoom Cloud Meeting*

C. Hasil Wawancara

1) P = “Assalamualaikum, wahramatullahi wabarakatuh. Selamat pagi kepada Bapak Baskara Pradipta selaku Koordinator Fungsi Kajian Kawasan Asia Timur dari Pusat Strategi Kebijakan Kawasan Asia-Pasifik dan Afrika, Badan Strategi Kebijakan Luar Negeri Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia (Kemlu RI) dan Mba Annisa Fitria Sari. Terima kasih sebelumnya telah meluangkan waktu di pagi hari dan atas kesediannya sebagai narasumber terkait penelitian skripsi saya. Bagaimana kabarnya pak?”

N = “Selamat pagi Mbak Kezia, Alhamdulillah saya sehat disini. Mbak sendiri bagaimana kabarnya? “

P = “Puji Tuhan sehat juga bapak. Izinkan saya untuk memulai dan merekam sesi wawancaranya ya pak?”

N = “Baik mba, silahkan dimulai”

P = “Terima kasih pak”.

2) P = “Izin menginformasikan bahwa penelitian skripsi saya berjudul ‘Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri New Southern Policy Korea Selatan Terhadap India Pada Masa Pemerintahan Presiden Moon Jae In (2017-2022)’. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengkaji implementasi serta kepentingan pemerintah Korea Selatan di India melalui New Southern Policy. Menurut Bapak bagaimana implementasi New Southern Policy di India secara khusus pada *pilar prosperity*?”

N = “Realisasi *pilar prosperity* New Southern Policy di India dititikfokuskan kepada kerja sama ekonomi seperti perdagangan, investasi, pemberian bantuan dana pengembangan dalam mekanisme *official development assistance* (ODA) hingga merambah pada ranah kerja sama sains dan teknologi. Kunjungan Moon Jae In ke India pada Juli 2018 untuk bertemu dengan PM Narendra Modi telah memberikan gambaran jelas bahwa Korea Selatan memandang India memiliki sejumlah potensi yang menguntungkan bagi Korea Selatan. Sehingga jika dibandingkan dengan pilar dua lainnya yaitu *peace* dan *people*, intensifikasi pilar *prosperity* lebih digencarkan oleh Korea Selatan”

P = “Baik, pak. Terima kasih atas jawabannya. Lantas, melihat implementasi pilar *prosperity* dari kebijakan yang baru saja diusung pada masa pemerintah Moon Jae In ini, bagaimana kepentingan Korea Selatan di India?”

N = “Terdapat banyak faktor yang mendasari perumusan kebijakan luar negeri New Southern Policy. Kerjasama Korea Selatan dan India tentu dilatarbelakangi oleh faktor-faktor yang bersifat politis. Dengan menargetkan India sebagai mitra spesifiknya dalam kebijakan tersebut maka pemerintah Korea Selatan telah bersikap adaptif terhadap perubahan-perubahan yang ada dan terjadi disekitarnya. Saya mencoba untuk menjabarkan apa yang menjadi basis konsiderasi Moon Jae In dalam menyusun kebijakan New Southern Policy tersebut:

N = “Dari perubahan internal seperti faktor idiosinkretik, perbedaan kepemimpinan dari Park Geun Hye ke Moon Jae In. Perbedaan tersebut dapat dilihat dari visi misi diplomatiknya atau gaya kepemimpinan yang dapat memengaruhi orientasi perumusan kebijakan luar negeri Korea Selatan. Secara parlemen di Korea didominasi oleh dua partai dominan beraliran konservatif dan liberal yang tentunya kita tahu sama-sama memiliki pandangan maupun ideologi politik yang berbeda dalam perumusan kebijakan luar negerinya. Selain itu, perubahan lainnya berfokus pada perusahaan dan industri Korea Selatan dan bagaimana kontribusi perusahaan konglomerat tersebut pada perekonomian Korea Selatan. Adanya sanksi dari Tiongkok dan dinamika geopolitik membuat banyak perusahaan Korea Selatan berupaya merealokasikan pusat industrinya dari Tiongkok ke negara lain. India yang saat ini menjadi berkembang menjadi salah

satu negara industri dan memenuhi kualifikasi untuk upaya realokasi seperti tenaga kerja murah, lokasi strategis, iklim investasi dan regulasi pemerintah yang mendukung. Korea Selatan sebagai negara industri sehingga mereka merasa perlu untuk mengembangkan kemampuan industrinya, investasi, perluasan dan penguasaan pasar dunia, dan lain-lainnya.

N = “Di awal masa pemerintahan Moon Jae In (2017-2022) menjadi fase kritikal bagi Korea Selatan. Ketika berbicara mengenai faktor eksternal tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa keempat negara yang berada disekitar negara ini diantaranya Amerika Serikat, Tiongkok, Jepang dan Rusia menjadi tolak ukur para pemangku kebijakannya terutama dalam permasalahan di Semenanjung Korea. Dalam tanda kutip ‘hambatan’ yang dialami oleh pemerintah Korea Selatan dalam menjalin relasi bersama keempat negara tersebut ialah Korea Selatan yang merasa bahwa kerjasama yang tercipta berjalan secara asimetris dan cenderung hanya menguntungkan negara adidaya tersebut seperti yang telah saya sebutkan. Hal tersebut memicu ketakutan sendiri bagi pemerintah Korea Selatan. Jika diingat kembali direntang tahun 2016-2018, sejumlah isu seperti merenggangnya aliansi Amerika Serikat-Korea Selatan dalam kaitan instalasi THAAD dan kesepakatan KORUS-FTA dimasa Donald Trump, disusul oleh adanya THAAD di Korea Selatan memicu reaksi keras dari Tiongkok yang berimbas pada penegakan sanksi ekonomi pada Korea Selatan. Posisi Korea juga semakin dilemma saat bagaimana pemerintah memposisikan dirinya dalam isu tensi geopolitik Amerika Serikat-Tiongkok yang berimplikasi menghambat proses perdamaian Intra-Korea”

N = “Sehingga New Southern Policy diupayakan sebagai jawaban atas isu-isu tersebut. New Southern Policy yang berarti Kebijakan Baru Kearah Selatan, dimaksudkan sebagai kebijakan yang menysasar negara atau regional di selatan Korea yaitu ASEAN dan India. Secara khusus pada konteks India, dalam beberapa tahun belakangan menjadi destinasi favorit negara ataupun perusahaan multinasional untuk mendirikan pusat manufaktur atau industrinya di negara yang bersangkutan. Sejumlah daya tawar India sebagai pusat manufaktur diantaranya upah tenaga kerja yang murah, lokasi strategis, tenaga kerja terampil, pertumbuhan demografi yang signifikan serta iklim regulasi pemerintah yang mendukung presensi perusahaan multinasional tadi. Terlihat dari bagaimana alokasi investasi Korea Selatan di India berpusat di sektor manufaktur dan disusul oleh infrastruktur. Secara geografis, ASEAN dan India tidak berada di wilayah Asia Timur sehingga tidak memberikan tekanan tersendiri bagi Korea Selatan jika dibandingkan dengan keempat negara adidaya tadi yang memiliki tendensi lebih kuat pengaruhnya atas Korea Selatan. Berdasarkan data perdagangan internasional Korea yang saya perhatikan, India juga sebagai negara dominan di Kawasan Asia Selatan menjadi mitra dagang utama Korea Selatan.”

N = “Namun dalam implementasinya, New Southern Policy kemudian menunjukkan kecenderungan lebih memprioritaskan ASEAN daripada India sebagai mitra kerjasamanya. Terutama di Vietnam bisa kita bandingkan total perdagangan, dana yang dikuncurkan oleh pemerintah Korea Selatan untuk

pendanaan investasi atau pengembangan infrastruktur dan realisasi programnya jauh berkali-kali lipat lebih banyak daripada India. Masih dalam konteks ASEAN, disusul oleh Kamboja dan Malaysia. Jadi sebetulnya mengapa Presiden Moon bermaksud untuk melaksanakan New Southern Policy dikarenakan kebijakan ini bertindak sebagai inisiatif pemerintah dalam urusan terkait diversifikasi kapabilitas ekonomi dan *soft power* nya”

N = “Sehubungan dengan itu perlu kita perhatikan bahwa basis dan tujuan kerjasama dari kedua negara harus didasarkan oleh aspek yang membawa keuntungan secara resiprokal. Daritadi kita banyak membahas perspektif Korea Selatan terhadap India. Sekarang kita perlu tahu mengapa saat kunjungan Presiden Moon Jae In bersama rombongannya ke India sangat diterima dan disambut baik dengan tangan terbuka oleh para pemangku kepentingan dan pemerintah India. Secara politik, India juga banyak berseberangan dengan Tiongkok. Hal ini kemudian juga dilihat oleh India untuk memilih meningkatkan *engagement* nya terhadap Korea Selatan. Selain itu, adanya Act East Policy yang merupakan kebijakan luar negeri India diluncurkan pada 2014 memiliki kesamaan visi-misi didalamnya. Sehingga kedua belah pihak bisa dengan lancar dan nyaman melaksanakan kerjasama didalam lingkup New Southern Policy dan Act East Policy mengingat relasi bilateral mereka sepanjang ini saya tahu cukup berjalan dengan baik. Itu sih mbak yang bisa saya jawab terkait pertanyaan nomor dua tadi.”

3) P = “Baik pak. Terima kasih banyak atas jawaban yang sangat komprehensif dari pertanyaan mengenai implementasi New Southern Policy hingga analisis perubahan-perubahan internal dan eksternal yang menjadi basis kepentingan Korea Selatan di India melalui New Southern Policy.”

N = “Sama-sama mbak. Apakah masih ada yang perlu untuk ditanyakan atau didiskusikan lagi lebih lanjut mengenai New Southern Policy?”

P = “Sejauh ini aman pak dari saya. Jawaban dari Bapak tadi sudah sangat menjawab pertanyaan yang saya ajukan. Sekali lagi, terima kasih banyak pak atas kesediaannya.”

N = “Siap mbak, sama-sama. Semoga membantu ya untuk proses penyusunan skripsinya.”