THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF JAPANESE NAVAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH SULAWESI IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1942 -1945

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Abstract

The Japanese economic policy in South Sulawesi seemed to have different policies when compared to its other colonies in Indonesia. Such the difference was also reflected by the difference in leadership typology of Japanese Navy based in Makassar and the Japanese Army based in Bukittingi and Java. In South Sulawesi, the policy was more focused on the compliance of logistic materials by strengthening the program of clothing industry, the plantation of cotton and castor oil, fisheries followed up with the development of their respective industries.

The economic activities were continuously encouraged in various ways to finance the war. The propaganda to establish economic enterprises was carried out elsewhere. Dai Nippon economic policy more emphasized on how the natural resources could be explored as maximum as possible. In addition to the exploration of natural resources, the effort to massive production of agricultural products took place in almost all areas in South Sulawesi. Such products were rice, pulses, corn, and many other crops that could be directly consumed in the great East Asia war. The important policy of the army was the massive production of agricultural sector that supported the war. In addition to agricultural sector, industrial sectors were also developed such as: salt, castor oil, textile, silk, handicrafts and the like.

This is a historical research using the archival sources at the Arsip Nasional RI in Jakarta and archives that have been published and stored at the Perpustakaan Nasional RI in Jakarta such as MVO (Memorie Van Overgave), reports the Japanese occupation in Makassar, archives of Romusha. activities in Makassar, documents about local politics on Japan in South Sulawesi. Reports on Japanese economic activity in South Sulawesi were also consulted. Data sources from the magazine and newspapers were taken at Perpustakaan Nasional RI include Pemberitaan Makassar, Bintang Timoor, Sinar Baroe, Soeara Asia, Hong Po and Pemandangan. In addition to such sources, the writer executed the direct interviews with informants who are still alive and have experiences about the Japanese colony.

The archival sources on East Indonesia were taken at Badan Perpustakaan dan Arsip Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan, The result of this research shows that the economic policies adopted by Japanese in South Sulawesi brought about great changes in building the new economic structure namely the emergence of the diversification of popular-based commodity specifically in strengthening the productions of clothing and foodstuff during the war. This is the reason why the people of South Sulawesi was directed to execute the intensification of agriculture, in a professional productive manner supported by communal industrial policy.

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1. Introduction

The effect of war and the Japanese military occupation led to comprehensive changes in economic structure in South Sulawesi. The main objective of Japanese invasion in South Sulawesi as it was to other parts of Indonesia was to explore its economic resources. With its fertile land and big population, South Sulawesi was considered to have an extraordinary potential economic resources. In such the case, the Japanese took advantage of the population as logistic resources. The Netherlands Indies was governed under the Japanese doctrine “Commonwealth Environment of the Great East Asia” which involved the whole Southeast and East Asia. The Japanese economic activities were led to logistic aspects where Japan became its headquarter. The people of South Sulawesi were insisted to support not only the Japanese military occupation but the military operations in a wide scale as well. The foodstuffs production became a priority to supply the military for the Great East Asia war. Although South Sulawesi had been able to be self-sufficient in foodstuff at the Nederlands Indies era, this condition was unable to sustain under Japanese occupation because there were so many productions to be encouraged as the impact of war.

During the war, the commodities exchange were restricted to only the areas under Japanese control and this led to great change in the ratio of supply and demand. In addition to foodstuff production, textile production was also given a priority because in the Dutch era, Java depended most of textile supply on import. It was the reason why the Japanese military instructed the farmers to plant cotton, mulberry, rosella, and jute. Many agricultural plants such as tea, coffee and sugarcane were replaced with core plants since there were no more marketing value and at the same time they had overproduction. This condition made the farmers had no option to plant any commodity in their land. The government strictly restricted the land to cultivate and this condition remind us the forced plantation system in nineteenth century.

At the end of twentieth century the Dutch government by Pax Nederlandica developed economic integration by creating the centres of economic growth in every region. In East Indonesia region, the centre was based in Makassar while South Sulawesi became foodstuff barn of Netherlands Indies which was supported by policies that encouraged the economic growth at the outside of Java. Many irrigation facilities were developed in South Sulawesi such
irrigations as: Bila, Bengo, Leworang, Palakka, as Di Selebes Selatan dibangun Irigasi pengairan secara besar-besaran. Irigasi tersebut antara lain: irigasi Bila, Bengo, Leworang, Palakka, Tempe, Sidenreng, Tallo, and Jeneponto. These irrigations had increased irrigated rice fields from 20,500 acres to 57,000 acres in the early 1936 and at the end of 1936 to 227,193 acres. Such increment gave impact on the increase of rice export rate from f. 300,000 to f 3,300,000. During the Japanese occupation, the rice production decreased because of many irrigation facilities were not functioned and caused the rice export rate lower down to f 2,7000,000 in 1943.

II Research Methods

This is a historical research using archives sources either in manuscript forms or interviews particularly in associated with economic policies in agricultural sectors (namely: cotton plantation, salt industry and fishery) and their implementation in the areas occupied by Japanese naval government. This research used interdisciplinary approach i.e.: historical and economical approaches based on documentary archives sources and interviews on community figures who played roles in the era of Japanese occupation in South Sulawesi.

The primary data were taken from collection of The Board of Library and Archives of South Sulawesi in Makassar. The data included documents on Sulawesi Province, documents on East Indonesia State, reports on Japanese occupation activities in Makassar, Romusa activities in Makassar, Local politics during Japanese occupation in South Sulawesi, brief notes trade activities in East Indonesia State.

The data were also taken from Nasional Archives in Jakarta included: Gouvernement Secretarie, Inventaris van het Archief van de Algemene Secretarie en Het Kabinet van de Gouverneur General 1944-1950. These two documents contain Besluit (stipulation) about trade policy in Makassar and also economic and political conditions. In addition to such documents, the writer also used recorded interviews cassette by M. Saleh Lahade, Riri Amin Daud, Kawilarang and others.

Data in published archives materials at Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-,Land-en Volkenkunde (KITLV) in Leiden, Koninklijk Instituut Voor De Tropen (KIT) in Amsterdam

3 Idische Verslag 1943 hal 344 lihat juga Sinar Baroe, Keadaan Perekonomian di Sulawesi Jumat 19 Mei 2065
and at Indonesian National Library in Jakarta were also consulted. Data in books, journals and newspapers about Makassar as a trading city were also included., Enomische Berichten Oost Indonesia 1949;The Economic Review of Indonesia vol. 1 1947, Vo 6 1952. Centre for Statistical Bureau entitle, Ekspor impor beberapa pelabuhan di Indonesia tahun 1947-1958 all were consulted. The magazine entitled Berita Ekonomi 1951-1956, Mingguan Tempo Doeloe which contain information on South Sulawesi economy after independence.

III Research Findings

A. Economic and Financial Policy

In a short time, Japanese military controlled most of Southeast Asia region and other East Asia. There was a notorious slogan of Japanese military” The God wind makes all the dry leaves fly. With this slogan the Japanese military occupied the area instantly. With an unpredictable powerful military troops, they invaded every states they passed through without any resistance. The Japanese military reached Indonesia lastly where Manado was the first to be occupied followed by other regions such as Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumatera, Java, and Jakarta.

No one could argue that the expansion of Japanese occupation to Asia and pacific regions needed a great expenditure on materials, natural and human resources and because of this situation, and for fund rising, the Japanese military established some efforts in economic sectors to finance the expensive war. The Romusha (forced labour) system was implemented in the whole hinterland areas.

Such mobilization of the people was not only done by the military itself with the slogan colonization release of the Great Asia, but it was also done national movement figures who directly encouraged the people to support the war done by Japanese Military (Dai Nippon)Anoth.

Another way to enhance the economic activities to finance the war was to do promote economic policy that emphasized the maximum exploration of natural resources. With this exploration of natural resources gave impact on massive agricultural products in most of the areas controlled by Japanese military. Such products were: rice, second crops, corn, etc. The important policy of Japanese military was massive production on commodities that supported the

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4 Sinar Baroe, Keadaan perekonomian di Sulawesi 25 Juli 2065
4 Soeara Asia 18 Mei 2064
war such as: cotton, rubber, and castor-oil plant project for alternative energy especially for aeroplane.6

The Japanese made propaganda not only in political aspect to make Great Asia free from colonization but also in economic aspect as well. At the war time which was more and more became dreadful, the war that also involved Indonesia, the economic sector became very crucial to backup the military in order to win the war.

The progress of education in South Sulawesi under Japanese naval government let to the establishment of schools and an increase amount of pupils. For example, there were 3791 people elementary schools with 2.375.600 pupils.7 In addition there were coffee and tea plantation movement together the intensification of foodstuff materials such as rice, corn and tuber. This program was under supervision of Juyoshokuryo Kanri Jimusho (The Main Foodstuff Supervision Office) who was also given charge for marketing, storage and setting up the price. Obviously, the economic condition at the war time was bad in relation with the price rises in trade sector. The price of daily needs of the people increased significantly high (especially for cigarette raised to two folds). The price of tooth brush raised from 30 cents to 50-85 cents, white thread from 1,5 cents to 4-71,5 cents, white shirt from 125 cents to 250-275 cents, 1 yard white cloth from 14 cents to 40-45 cents.8

To dominate Netherlands Indies economy, the Japanese prime minister designed the economic development program for common wealth. He said that the majority of people in Great East Asia would become a priority in the development of forestation, agriculture and fishery to equalize the industrial sector. Some efforts had been done to distribute the foodstuff based on people needs.

At the meeting of People Representatives of Tokyo at 28-01-2603 (1943) Okinorikaya, Japanese Ministry of Finance delivered his speech on financial policy to the council. According to Okinorikaya: “the Japanese economy is good and the finance is sufficient. The southern area will be developed and economic relation among the Japanese ally is also satisfactory”. In order to win the Pacific war, the economy had to be strengthened. The Japanese economic policy was merely directed to win all aspects and to avoid the distortion of government activities. To satisfy this condition, some aids for economic empowerment were given as the following:

a) Improving people health = 78 millions yen
b) People security control = 130 millions yen

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6 Pada tahun 1939, 46% dari nilai impor Hindia Belanda datang dari Belanda dan 14% datang dari Amerika Serikat, sementara 28% dari nilai ekspor Hindia Belanda untuk Belanda dan 21% untuk Amerika Serikat Hal ini berarti bahwa hubungan-hubungan dagang zaman dulu terutama dilakukan negaranegara "musuh", yang secara otomatis berhenti dengan pecahnya perang
7 Sinar Barue Juni 2604
8 Suara Asia Januari 2064
c) Armed forces management = 155 millions yen

d) Improving education = 150 millions yen

e) Improving science and technology = 61 millions yen

The revenue from iron mining taxation and coral was about 9,995,000,000 yen. The gain from income tax was 6,580,000 yen. At the mean time, the national saving was increased and the people were pleased to support the government. This made the tax was easily collected and the bonds were quickly sold. The diversification of new taxation added the income to 1,140,000,000 yen yearly.  

The Japanese expenditure was well managed where poundsterlings were easily collected. New bonds were sold to public at the rate above 3,000 millions yen. Since the war of Great East Asia was won by the Japan, its economic condition became powerful. The economic relation of Japan in Asia indicated by the cooperation of Mantjoekoeo and Tiongkok in improving economy. Poen Thai and Indo-China empowered Japanese labour. On the other hand, Japan gave aids its allies to improve their economy. Last year Japan invested 100 million yen in Manjoekoeo and Tiongkok.

To enhance the wealth of Japan, the Japanese government made new strategy for developing economy by making agreement with its allies in Europe. Such agreements were: Developing New Economy, Highly appreciation on His excellency Gunseikan. To empower the economy in Java, Keizal Singikai (Economic Investigation Board) held the meeting to make economic program for conialized areas on June 12, 1943 in Tyuucu Hookookaikan Djakarta.

The speech of His excellency Gunseikan emphasized that the Dutch colonialization policy for centuries didn’t make economic prosperity for Indonesian people. In order to improve economic condition for the everlasting prosperity of Indonesian people, there should be designed the basic development to bring Indonesian independence eventually.

The Japanese army desinged a new economic structure based on the concept and idea of Netherland Indies economic goals by the establishment of the committee on the preparation for new economic people structure called Zyuumin Keisai Sintaisai Zyumbi Inkai. This committee was also given charge to investigate the preparation of independence and designed the fundamental economic development as the basis for state establishment. During the war, there were three sectors in economy done namely:

a. Increasing production rationally,

b. Collecting goods for government to fulfill war logistics

c. Distributing goods evenly to people.

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9 Sinar Baroe Senen Januari 2064
In connection with the enemy landed in Tarakan and Balikpapan, and his further target was Sulawesi, the civilian navy of Japan strengthened the economy in the islands in order to protect Sulawesi from enemy attack. This protection could be done since the Japanese military during three years of his control had made the commodities overwhelming and military equipments as well as defence were powerful.

Only in two-week of occupation, when the government set the price of the rice, 30% of them were given to government and day by day increased. In addition, the cooperation with Indonesian people, corn plantation, fishery and sea bird catching, freshwater fishery all were done successfully.

In Sulawesi, the weaving machine had been being prepared in order to be self-sufficient in clothing. This program was directed in South Sulawesi to continue the battle for self determination to have independence. To support the South Sulawesi economy, some rules for popular crediting had been issued on July 2, 1943 as follows:

a) People Bank established in major cities in South Sulawesi
b) Each local Bank owned capital at the amount of f100,000 or above and if this capital is lower than this amount, the local government will suffice
c) The local people banks are obliged to give loan to the people and pay them by installment based on the time set up, provide capital for credit institutions run by people and handle deposit as well establishing other banks.
d) People Banks may not use their extra money unless they purchase shares determined by the government.
e) People Banks will cooperate with rural banks which will be established at various sites.10

These rules were not yet understood by many merchands in the era of Japanese occupation. They said the rules were not published and communicated. Although there was a barn to raise the price, many merchands raised their goods price or they collected as many goods as possible and sold them when they had expensive price. Anyhow, some merchands were arrested because they against the rules. When they were caught before leaving Jakarta, they were accused to:

a) Collecting trading goods unproportionally.
b) Making the price control in disorder.11

10 Sinar Baroe Jumat 27 Nov 2062
Purchasing goods irrationally depended on whether such goods traded legally or not. A merchant was said to against the rules when they bought thing in black market and illegal price.

**B. Japanese Policy in Foodstuff Plantation**

During Japanese occupation, the cultivation of agricultural land in rural areas were agreed by the majority people to maximize rice production. During Japanese occupation, the slogan “multiple folds of production” was implemented everywhere. This concept was communicated by the government at the meetings with community and published in various media.

With fertile land and huge manpower, South Sulawesi had a good condition for planting rice and by the end of Dutch period, south Sulawesi produced about 4 millions tons a year. There were 3, 4 millions acres of rice fields in 1940 or equivalent to 42.7% of the whole land in Sulawesi. However, since lack of technology, fertilizer and fund to develop irrigation facilities, the plantation was done traditionally and brought about lower production. The average of harvest per acre in 1938/39 were 1500, 3 kilograms of pounded rice or about 40% of Japanese production at the same year. The variety of rice production in South Sulawesi depended upon local conditions.

There were three main rice producers in South Sulawesi namely Pare-pare, Bone and Bonthain. Whereas the areas where lower rice production were Mandar and Luwu. There were also variety of production per capita where Pare-pare was the highest (345 kg) and the lowest was Bone (46 kg). 12

Although an increase of foodstuff production became a crucial program by military government in the early of its occupation, this program needed a clear implementation just after November 1943, when the government made constitution called *Kinhoji Sibokuoya Taisaku* (Urgently Actions on Foodstuff Materials) 3) With this program the government rules on increasing production were focused on (a) introducing new rice variety, (b) innovation of plantation technology (c) enhancing agricultural infrastructure. (d) rice field expansion and (e) propaganda and training for farmers. 13 As the consequence of intensification program, there was no more land to cultivate particularly in Java. On the other hand, Japan had a high technology and

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11 *Aturan baru pengangkutan barang*, Soeara Asia.7 Djoeni 2604.
12 12 *Sinar Baroe, Keadaan perekonomian di Sulawesi* 20 Juli 2605

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13 *Kerusakan pabrik Beras*, *Sinar Baroe Jum’at 3 Juni 1942*.
experts which they wanted to transfer to Javanese farmers through those aspects mentioned above.

C. The Policy on People Salt Industry

Salt was considered important for it could not be replaced by other materials. Salt is our daily need besides rice. Salt is people property and so is rice to sustain their lives. This property may not be seized by the government but it should be maintained for maximum supply.\(^\text{14}\) How was the stock of the salt?

In the colonial government era, the stock of salt was arranged to fulfill the supply for five years. This arrangement, however, had never been effective. The salt produced by the government for one year were between 100 and 300 thousands tons while the consumption were 300 thousands tons. Just in the years before the second world war, the salt production got a little increase even the Japan adopted forced work (Romusha). The decrease of salt production in Madura was a clear indication when at the end of Japanese occupation, the principal of salt industry executed suicide because he was afraid and ashamed to welcome the Saiko Sikikan visit. As the anticlimax of salt famine was the cancelation of salt monopoly in April 1945.

By the early years of Indonesian republic government i.e: 1945, 1946 and 1947 the salt production in Madura even decreased lower to around 10% of the consumption. The decrease of this production was caused by lacking of manpower in Madura. The salt industry that had to employ 20,000 manpowers, employed only 5,000 manpowers. In addition to this salt famine, the transportation of salt in land as well as in sea was also difficult. Meanwhile the Japanese colonial government also canceled salt monopoly. The only way to overcome salt famine was to instruct all people who lived at the seashore to make salt. This policy was supported by the establishment of people salt extention office.

This opportunity was well received by the people along the seashore at Jeneponto and Mandar. In making salt, the sea water was dried in small pond and this resulted in form of white crystal with contained at least 80% NaCl.

This salt industries employed thousand hundreds of people living along the seashore.

Most of them had their own ponds, hired or were given by the government. In this year, Jeneponto has produced around 50 thousands tons.

It is obvious that salt industry which was done by people could guarantee an adequate stock to overcome salt famine. The government of Indonesia Republic who took over sovereignty from the Dutch still practiced salt monopoly. On the other hand, salt industry in Jogyakarta and Rembang were carried out although it collided with monopoly and this made the situation unfair.

It doesn’t matter whether the salt monopoly as colonial inheritance, was directed to finance the state. Anyhow, it is worthy to study further who will get benefit nowadays: the state or the people. Whether or not the salt monopoly be maintained?

D. Cotton Plant Plantation

In Dutch occupation era, the cotton productions were still low. In 1937, the plantation land was only about 4000 acres with raw cotton productions were around 6500 tons. Meanwhile the consumption in Netherlands Indies were around 91 000 tons. This means that there were only around 7 percent supplied by domestic production and the rest were imported. Cotton wool which were imported for the whole Netherlands Indies in 1939 were 13, 772 tons and cotton materials were 62, 089 tons (Idische Verslag 1940 p. 344). By the time the Japanese occupied Netherlands Indies, cotton production was considered important. It was the reason why the plantation of cotton plants was urgently done and even importing cotton was quickly realized. Japanese government brought 3 million meters of white cloth and 5 millions meters of gauze from Tokyo in October 1942 until March 1943. However, there was no data whether or not such amounts were fulfilled. It was impossible to satisfy that lots since the shipment was very difficult because of the war in Great East Asia.

The Japanese military government announced a five-year plan to intensify cotton production in 1942 with a target about 350,000 kg and an area of 2500 acres. In 1943, the target raised to 7,000,000 kgs and an area of 30 000 acres. In 1944 the productions were 130 00000 kgs with an area of 50 000 acres. In 1947 the productions reached 50,000,000 kgs with a planting area 180.000 acres. 15

The five-year plan for planting cotton in Java and Sulawesi was carried out by collecting equipments, technicians, establishing a board named “Mengka Saibai Kyokai”. In December

1942 land had been prepared to be cultivated by various firms under the cooperation with some of appointed local governments.

As the consequence of this program, the local government felt very difficult to get seeds and as the result, most of the seeds were imported from abroad particularly from Japan. Fortunately under the aids of Japanese navy, some thousands of “Express” seeds variety were brought to us from Sulawesi. In May 1943 thousands of seeds had been planted in thousands acres in Sulawesi and Java.

A threat to cotton plantation in hot land in South area came from cotton pest. To eliminate such pest, the technicians of the firms controlled the coming pests and killed them to reduce their attack. There were also a sort of bumblebee pests in Bantaeng and Bulukumba with the local name “Kilanka”. In Malang existed other pests but they all could be killed with pesticide materials and by catching them. The pests attack happened when cotton plants started to bloom and at this time the pest could be destroyed. Generally, plant maintenance was said to be successful although it was not totally perfect. In edition to this pest, there were also weeds which the Japanese called them “Hamasuge”. These weeds grew rapidly so they needed a lot of manpowers to pull them up.

Another factor which affected the cotton production was weather. Fortunately the weather condition in 1943 was much rain compared to the previous years. That was why the cotton plants that were planted in December had an extra long branches. In contrary with Java and Sulawesi islands, the Phillipines and Taiwan where there were often attacked by storm, Java and Sulawesi islands almost had no storm during the cotton plantation. This situation resulted in appreciation to cotton plantation firms in Java and Sulawesi eventually. (Sangyobu – Gunseikanbu Jakarta, 19 April– 1943).

Because of price determination of cotton produced in Java influenced the cotton plantation firms eventually, and this condition had been well considered by the government. Nowadays cotton price which had been set up by the government as the following:

Class 1. Rp18,- per 100 kgs
Class 2. Rp.16, per 100 kgs
Original variety in Makassar Rp.13 per 100 kgs

17 Suara Asia 2063
18 Sinar Baroe 2063
E. Castor-oil Plant Plantation

In the meeting of Nomuka representative, he said that of all war equipments, aeroplane is said to be vital to win the war in Great East Asia. Castor-oil contributed as source of energy to win the war. Castor-oil seeds produce oil which can be use as fuel for aeroplane. The atmosphere of Sulawesi is good to plant castor-oil seeds. How far the contribution of castor-oil seeds to war arms could be indicated that every 280 castor-oil trees were able to fly a bomber aeroplane 20 hours long or equivalent to 14 trees per hour. For training aeroplane, it needed only 4 trees for an hour fly.

In addition castor-oil with Java variety could deliver more yields until 20,000 fruits per one tree. A thousand of good quality castor-oil fruit weighted 50 gram whereas the common quality weighted only 35 grams. Average tree could yield 400 grams and when this amount were distilled, it could result 180 grams of oil.

Other plants to be obliged for famers to plant were castor for lubricating oil. Before the war, South Sulawesi had a limited production especially in Gowa, Bontain, Bulukumba and Bone, and this production was only around 10,000 tons. At that time, there were 30 percent of castor oil exported by South Sulawesi to Japan. This oil was particularly used as lubricating material for aeroplane machine and since the war, the need for this oil by Japanese army increased rapidly. Japanese military government in Makassar tried to increase castor oil production. He set up the target from the amount of 40,000 tons in 1943 to raise up to 60,000 tons in 1944. To satisfy this target, great campaign had been started since 1942 and to be continued during occupation time.19

F. Weaving Cotton Cloth in South Sulawesi

In addition to farms, spinning and weaving cotton were also encouraged in rural areas. Training and courses for spinning were carried out by every level of government. For example, in Bone and Sinjai regencies, there were two representatives of fujinkai from every districts sent to regency capital city and trained for three months in 1944. This training was sponsored by Hokokai and fujinkai at regency branch offices led by regent’s wife. The trainees stayed at the boarding house near regent office. They learnt how to extract the raw cotton fibres from its seeds (kernels) and span them into cotton fibres. After training, they went back home and executed the same training at district level. The trainees at this level came from every villages. The tools used in training to extract and spin the cotton were provided by the government. The costs for training, food and accommodation of the trainees were provided by Hokokai.

In Malino, Gowa regency, some schools of cotton spinning existed permanently. With

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19 Sinar Baroe 2063
these courses, the technique of spinning cotton had been mastered by rural people. As the result, many householders ran this business. With the cotton fibres they produced, the householders started to weave and activated the traditional weaving tools. Before the war (1941) there were many hands weaving tools for industry in the hinterlands area of Bugisness. With the Japanese support, weaving as home industries developed in many areas in South Sulawesi. They made their own tools imitating the tools provided by the government. In many cases, the scale production of weaving was small and just for satisfying the need of the family. They, however, probably sold one or two pieces of their productions if there were a surplus or they needed cash for expenditures.

According to an informant H Ambo in Sinjai, one could sell a piece of sarong weaved by hand in black market with the price of 400 kgs rice equivalent. One piece of sarong took four days to weave. Because of its lacking, the cloth could be used as media of exchanges or barter. It was estimated that a piece of sarong needed 300 grams of raw cotton while this amount were harvested in two square meters of land.

Spinning and weaving as home industry in Maros were carried out in every areas. With this condition, the shortage of cloth could be overcome for a certain level after 1944. The skill of farming, spinning and weaving in rural people then revitalized under Soekarno regime with the slogan "Berdiri di Atas Kaki Sendiri" (Berdikari: self sufficient), and manual weaving machine made in Japanese occupation were reused and given name as ATBM (Alat Tenon Bukan Mesin).

Regardless this home industry, raw cotton that was sold to Japan lastly were given to spinning manufactures controlled by the government. The total productions of cotton fibres and cloth at the end of occupation were: cotton fibres 171.600 pound/month, wide cloth 270.000 m/month, and narrow cloth 2.830 pieces/month.

Other textile materials which were encouraged by Japanese authority included hard fibres such as: hemp, jute, rosella and mulberry. Hemp and jute were put in priority since these materials had fibres relatively soft and could be made clothing material as well bags for agricultural products. All famers who were interviewed complaint for lacking cloth and gunny sack for shorts in Japanese occupation.

In the Dutch period, eight millions of gunny sacks were produced a year although this

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20 Soelawesi,pekerjaan Tenun di Sulawesi. Sinar Baroe,Selasa 7 juli 43,
amount satisfied only 35% of the demands and the rest of it should be imported from India.\textsuperscript{90) Since the import was stagnant, Japan had to satisfy their needs and in June 1942 through the intensification program called \textit{Nanpo Ko-iki Asarui Zosan Keikaku Yoko} in "Ko" area, Southeast Asia. This program was designed by Planning Bureau (\textit{Kikakuin}) of Japanese Government. Based on this program, there were 81 productions targeted for jute/rosela and gunny sack between the yaer of 1942 and 1947.

With good natural condition and energetic people, cotton plantation in the whole Sulawesi had started and gave good prospect. It was hoped that in five years the production became multifolds. According to the report written by an expert that the weather and land either in the whole Sulawesi or in Small islands in southeast Indonesia were infact suitable for cotton plantation.

\textbf{G. Conclusion}

This study is about the economic policy and its implementation in the area where Japanese navy governed especially in South Sulawesi. The existence of Japanese government in South Sulawesi at Second World War seemed to have two major interests. Firstly, Makassar was made as a center maritime fleet of Japanese navy, and secondly, South Sulawesi was driven to empowering the war logistics. These two aspects gave impacts on the type of strategies in political and economic policies implemented in South Sulawesi. This was quiet different in Java, where people were directed to be \textit{romuscha} and labors in various sectors of minings and plantations. Whereas in South Sulawesi, the Japanese was more cooperative with local kings related to economic development. Not only was the different type and policy characteristics based on individual area but also the characteristics of population became a main consideration for policy implementation. In addition, there was also a polarization between Japanese army and navy in Java island. Such polarization was interesting to study in order to get a deeply understanding about the history of Japanese occupation in Indonesia especially in South Sulawesi during the war period i.e., decolonization period and the replacement of Dutch regime to Japanese occupation. The way of Local kings fought against the Dutch seemed to have affected the local kings attitude to be loyal to Japanese government. In fact, this research is supposed to correct various researches done by historians and other scientists who were concerned to the dynamics of local history of Japan in Indonesia and who tended to equalize Java and outside Java.
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