Norms and Values in Japanese Democracy Assistance towards Southeast Asia Countries, 2008 – 2013

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Abstract

Japan has a unique way in interpreting its involvement in global movement of democratization. Although Japan boosts an adequate experience in transition to democracy after World War II as well as the economic prowess, Japan’s participation in democratization internationally has been very low for more than 50 years. The Japanese involvement in democracy assistance around the world can be considered minor compared to other donor countries, especially among the OECD DAC members. In relation with regional priority, Japanese ODA consistently place Southeast Asia as the main target for development assistance but with lesser compliance with supporting governance and civil society known as the core component of democracy assistance. While Japan has adopted new foreign policy strategy known as the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, including Southeast Asia region, there still remains a need and opportunity to increase Japan’s engagement in democratization process, either by promoting or protecting democracy.

Keywords: Democracy Assistance, Governance, Southeast Asia.

A. INTRODUCTION

Japan suffered great devastation after the World War II. Two main cities (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) destroyed by atomic bombs, the first and only atomic bombs detonated in human history. Many other cities also devastated by the War. The country’s capital Tokyo, for example, had been a target of B-29 bombardier during 9 – 10 of March 1945 prior to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The city had been a main target of Operation Meetinghouse by the United States and its allied, where the air raid recorded as the most devastated single air raid in history (Long 2011). Starting from the ruins after World War II, Japan strives to rebuild and recovers the nations by realizing that they have been a united and unbreakable imperium for about 2,500 years.

Throughout 70 years post the World War II, Japan had passed dozen of incidents either as a nation or a state. As the reflection that was revealed early within the message of the Emperor Akihito, Japan had run into downfall, severe poverty, aggressive nationalism obstacle, natural disaster, conflict with its neighbor countries, up to enjoying their position as a developed
country with high economic development, sophisticated technology, and even become one of the biggest donor countries. At a glance, the idea of a new Japan, as being disclosed by the Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, had a rational reason. Yet, international entities were eyeing this idea suspiciously. The history and the constellation of Japan relationship with other countries around the world hinder the idea into materialization.

The strong effort and spirit (expertise mentioned it as ethos) among the Japanese has shorten, even at an amazing pace, the reconstruction process post the World War II. After an unconditional surrender to the West Allies at 15 August 1945 in a very severe downfall, Japan relies on the international aid. But in a short 10 years (in 1954) Japan bounced back as a country that is able to give international aids at the moment when they joined The Colombo Plan (Kawasaki 2014). In the decade of 1960’s up to1970’s, Japan enjoying in a period where its economic growth geared up so fast, in which various infrastructure had been developed along with massive innovations in the realm of technology for a better life. In the decade of 1980’s, Japan stood as one of the most economically stable countries in the world; surpassed the economic growth of United States of America (Wile 2013). In 1989, Japan outperformed the United States of America as the biggest donor country internationally (Kawasaki 2014). This was a remarkable achievement in the history of Japan’s foreign aid, including in the aid for democracy.

In spite of its position as a leader donor in foreign aid and development assistance, Japan’s role in democracy assistance was minimal. Although a recognizable efforts and advancement had been conducted in the last 20 years in the field of democracy assistance, the contribution is still “low profile” (Ichihara 2013, 11). Especially when it compared to countries like the other main promoters of democracy, for instance the United States, who gained vast international attentions globally (including some negative highlights because of the failure of democracy promotion in Russia and Egypt).

Japanese democracy assistance become the integral part of the Japan Official Development Assistance (ODA) which been formally coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs trough active role of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Comparing to the others state, Japanese strategy in distributing democracy aid is focusing upon non-political issues (for instance general election, strengthening political party or any trusteeship body). JICA focused the aid upon Good Governance issues (including the anti-corruption) and civil society development. In JICA’s perspective, governance was devoted to a concept that cover not only the government bodies but also the system and mechanism that influence the interactions among government, civil society, private sector (Miyahara 2011, 67).

Japanese democracy assistance becomes an interesting issue, especially when it is associated with the increasing of dissatisfaction in other countries due to stagnation of democracy around the world. Though, by statistic the process of
democracy and democratization in the last decade is stable (Levitsky and Way 2015), yet in several transitional countries the practice are in the threat of authoritarianism (Diamond 2015).

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The formulation of the questions in this article is elaborate as follows: (1) How to explain the international political motives of the Japanese involvement in democracy assistance and its implication to Japan democracy diplomacy in Southeast Asia? (2) How would the focus to encourage the strengthening of good governance and civil society empowerment influence Japan involvement as a country with new vision of foreign policy in the region? (3) How is the prospect of Japanese democracy assistance to the Southeast Asian countries in order to achieve the future development of the foreign policy strategy and involvement of Japan in the regional and international arenas?

C. METHODOLOGY

This research will focus on Japanese democracy assistance as the main subject of analysis. In this context, the author limits the concept of Japanese democracy assistance as part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) which based on bilateral approach according to the standard provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Based on this standard, democracy assistance is categorized as development assistance which is designed to promote governance and civil society.

Primary data were collected from interviews and direct observation. Interviews with key person and key informants comprising of practitioners and public officials in the foreign policy department as well as Japanese democracy assistance operators.

An analytical technique is an arrangement procedure and data organizations based on a particular pattern. In a qualitative approach, data analysis is being based on the researcher’s subjective perspectives according to the pre-defined criteria. In this research, the author uses a combination of historical and comparative approach. The author’s historical approach is used to describe the current position of Japan’s democratic aid by observing the history and development of Japan’s democratic aid post 1945 (the first time Japan emerged as donor state after the World War II).

D. JAPAN’S SOUTHEAST ASIA STRATEGY

The Pacifism principle is a direct impact from United States intervention which was began in Japan on September 1945 on behalf of the allies. The presence of the United States for approximately seven years brought a vision to strip down the aggressive characteristics of Japan as the West sees. Total reformation that been carried during this occupation era encompasses most part of life, this include the authority to rewrite the laws, economy and restructuring of the political system, moreover to redefine the values of Japanese culture (Gordon 2003, 229). The result of this occupation and intervention is demilitarization but also democratization on the other side. Japan was able to take advantage of this “stripped down” circumstance by consistently becoming a peaceful nation, not involved in any open
armed conflict with other countries, therefore this country could concentrated the post-war restructuration to maximize the economic development.

However, the fact that this country is facing no small international challenges causing the issue of returning Japan’s military rights creates discourse. Since 2010, Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) started to intensively perform military training in the sea located close to those islands under dispute with China. In fact that in the joint training on 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe showed up with military attribute (CCTV News 2013). This is the first time of a Japanese Prime Minister shows up in public with this type of attribute, which assumed by most of the analyst as a serious expression by Japanese government to start arming and developing the military.

The new Japan substantively started to come at the 1990s, as the rise of Japanese economy after they succeeded in overcoming their domestic economy problems post-World War II. In 1993, a Japanese senior officer and honored figure in politics, Ichiro Ozawa wrote a book entitled: Blueprint for a New Japan (Nihon Kaizou Keikaku). This book stole the attention of the United States and the world, in such a way that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) translated. The English version was published in 1994 and become a best-selling book. The book is a pronouncement from a Japanese politician, where Ozawa was known as a back-stage figure (he was often called the Shadow Shogun or ‘yami shogun’) in many Japan political decision back then in the time (Harris 2009).

The most interesting idea from this book is the argument that Japan has now returned to its identity as a normal state (futsuu no koni). Ozawa assumes that Japan’s condition is below par as a state (Johnson 1994). This “normal state” has actually been delivered before by a few western revisionist experts, but in a different context. If these revisionists saw the concept in Japan capitalist framework (economy policy perspective), Ozawa understood that it was more a concept to re-armed Japan, so they may actively participate on United Nations’ peacekeeping operations (international politics perspective). Ozawa proposed an amendment of Article 9, 1947 Constitution by adding a third paragraph that enables the usage of arms for international peace necessities (Johnson 1994). Yet, this concept was sharply criticized even inside the country of Japan, where Ozawa’s proposal is viewed as a betrayal of the pacifism principle in Japan’s foreign policy.

However, the book’s presence created a new awareness of Japan’s existence that has been gaining more roles on the global level. For example, in the overseas development assistance, Japan has succeeded the United States’ position as the biggest donor country by amount in 1989. In the Official Development Assistance’s framework of the strategy and performance, this achievement was marked as an important momentum for Japan’s foreign policy.

The effort to formulate the idea of “New Japan” in the form of the Japanese government’s restructured policies could be traced back to the Foreign Affairs
Minister’s speech at that time, Taro Aso, in front of The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on December 7th, 2005. By the speech entitled *Asian Strategy as I See It: Japan as the “Thought Leader” of Asia*, Aso offered the idea of Asia’s leadership in a more soft form that came from the same idea in the time of the World War. Broadly speaking, Aso identified Japan in three optimistic perspectives; Japan as “leader in terms of ideas”, Japan as the stabilizer, and Japan as a country that respects other nations as equal partners (Aso 2005).

As a leader in terms of ideas, Japan is a country that has gone through almost all the experience of national and state life, as well as in the field economy, politics, and social culture. Japan overcame several problems through “direct experience”. This makes now the time for Japan to share those ideas with other countries in Asia through an approach Aso referred to as *trailblazing* ("the pacesetter"). Various problems now faced by the Asian nations, both in economy and politics, has been successfully faced and overcome by Japan in the 1950s and 1960s (Aso 2005).

As a stabilizer, nowadays Japan is living in the most stable economy and political situation in Asia. Despite the challenge and dynamics that are always faced, this country has created a permanent mechanism and is ready to answer a variety of issues. That allows Japan to contribute to regional stability in general. As the oldest democracy country in Asia, this makes Japan is the oldest country with the market economy system in Asia, Japan is now transforming into an internal region stabilizer. In that context, it is important for Japan to develop permanent ties with the pillars in the region, such as ASEAN (Aso 2005).

Moreover, as an equal partner to other countries in Asia, Japan has proved capable of having maintaining relationships regardless of their status, strength, wealth, and “right or left winged”. For example, Aso recalls the ASEAN’s 10th anniversary in 1977; Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda invited them to build a “heart to heart” relationship as the basis of Japan–ASEAN relations. Japan has also fully realized that in the past they had brought quite an amount of suffering to people in Asia, especially Korea and China, where that consciousness has pushed Japan to put out the good and equal neighborhood living forward, not only to both countries but to all Asian nations (Aso 2005).

Taro Aso’s speech resulted in intense discussion. Most people consider that Japan idea to re-appear as the leader of Asia is suspicious, recalling the historical memory left by World War II. At that time, Japan launched an occupying campaign in East Asia with a very popular principle in Indonesia titled “3-A”, Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia, and Japan the light of Asia.

Although Aso mentioned the Japanese superiority of being the oldest democratic country, it has not been reflected in their foreign policy concepts actually. Over the decades since the end of World War II, Japan has participated in international politics, both in the global and regional level is focused on the effort to develop a good relationship, dominate the provision of assistance to economic development, infrastructure and technical
infrastructure. However, Japan ignores the promotion of non-traditional issues which is increasingly becoming more accepted as a global value, such as human security, human rights promotion, and democracy promotion.

The expansion of Japan’s relations with the Southeast Asian countries involving the issue of democracy began in the year 2000 (Kliman and Twining 2014, 19), although the historical trail of the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia could be traced back to the middle of the 1970. In Japan perspective, Southeast Asia has a strategic and important influence for the security and welfare future, driven by at least two factors; geographically located in the intersection of Pacific Oceans and Indian Oceans and filled with emerging market countries, and become a sub-region that have an important role in the regional institution development (for example the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation or the ASEAN+3 dialog mechanism).

E. APPROACH AND STRATEGY OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

From the perspective of Japanese government, foreign assistance in the context of ODA mostly considered as grant or loan with a very soft conditions, provided by public agencies, mostly aimed to contribute to promote economic development and every effort to increase prosperity in the target countries. Most of Japanese ODA has been targeted to developing countries which are situated in respective area according to list of development assistance recipient prepared by Development Assistance Committee of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (MOFA Japan 2009).

The disbursement of Japanese ODA implemented through two channeling, namely bilateral assistance and assistance through multilateral institutions (multilateral assistance). The distribution of assistance through bilateral approach consists of “grants” and loan. Both of these models of disbursement go through government channel, normally based on agreement between government of Japan and the partner (recipient) countries. Government loans will be listed as loan aid or Official Development Assistance loan (ODA loan). In its implementation, the loan will utilize to finance either project or non-project activities in the recipient countries or on the behalf of recipient countries.

The grant assistance normally consists of grant aid and technical cooperation mechanism. The utilization of grants aid could be by direct fund transferred or by supporting activities in collaborations within the Japanese authorized institutions with the government or designated agencies in the recipient countries. While in the term of technical assistance, the implementation could be varied, from training, dispatching of expert, or development planning.

The type of activity through grants aid could be disbursement fund to finance general project, provide assistance for Japanese NGO project which operates in the recipient country, and providing emergency assistance in the situation that need quick response. The grant aid also could be allocated to support cultural
activity and assistance for grassroots human security project. For the last type of activities, Japan’s government has given much more attention to the issue and has involved in many activities related to human security issues in recipient countries.

In Southeast Asia, a relatively large number of people agree that Japan’s development cooperation has been a great boon to their nation. But even if ODA loans and Japanese technical assistance help a nation achieve economic growth, it should be the people of that country who deserve the most credit. So it’s only natural for a people to attribute their country’s success to their own hard work. Bridges that are built with ODA financing from JICA usually bear the logo of JICA or Japan’s aid and over time that mark has proliferated around the world. But as the years go by, people may forget (Akihiko 2014).

If we take a look at the data provided before, the status of Japanese democracy assistance in the context of OECD DAC member contribution is relatively low. Even though Japan is the second largest ODA provider in the world, but most of the assistance go to other sectors rather than governance and civil society sector which is stated as democracy assistance components.

From the breakdown of the data of democracy assistance component, in the last six years (2008 to 2013 periods), contribution share of Japanese democracy assistance compare to OECD DAC members is 2.72% equal to US$ 1,772.38 million, while the total OECD DAC share for democracy assistance program is US$ 65,090.86 million. Amongst the 11 sub sectors, Japan’s contribution to the “public sector policy and administration management” sub sector is amounted to US$ 884.74 million or 5.79% of total OECD DAC member contribution to this sub sector.

In general, the amount of Japanese democracy assistance distributed through ODA has a dynamic in the six years. In 2008, the amount of Japanese democracy assistance is US$ 290.50 million or 2.24% of total Japan’s ODA. The amount decreased in 2009 to become US$ 277.33 million or 1.51%; and decreased significantly to become US$ 177.81 million or 1.20% of total Japan’s ODA. In the year 2011, the amount of Japanese democracy assistance increased almost double, to become US$ 528.05 million or about 2.94% of the total Japanese ODA. In the year 2012, the amount of Japanese democracy assistance increased to become US$ 615.19 million or it shared 3.96% of total Japanese ODA. But in 2013, the amount decreased again to only US$ 392.03 million or 2.27% of total ODA share.

The figures in 2011 and 2012 allocation of Japanese democracy assistance indicate the changes in how Japanese government understands the importance of involvement in the democracy promotion activities around the world. That increasing also tends to respond the demand from the ongoing transition and reformation in Middle East which was known as “Arab Spring” which started in December 2010 in Tunisia.
F. JAPANESE DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia is considered as one of the core region in Japanese ODA strategy and policy. From the ODA Charter, either in 1992 version or 2003 version, Southeast Asia is considered as the main priority area. The importance of the region become much more important after the recognition of the new foreign policy strategy in 2006 called “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, which stated the importance of the region in linking the connection with other Asian region including South Asia until Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Southeast Asian consists of 11 countries, 10 of them are member of ASEAN plus Timor Leste. Among these countries, 9 of them are the Japanese ODA recipient, excluding Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. The total amount of Japanese ODA to this region in the last six years is US$ 29,909.79 million. This amount is equal to about 31% of total Japanese ODA worldwide in this period which amounted to US$ 96,851.69 million. Most of the assistance has been spent to support economic and social infrastructure, basic human need, including humanitarian aids.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camboja</td>
<td>114.36</td>
<td>257.24</td>
<td>231.03</td>
<td>228.89</td>
<td>193.31</td>
<td>245.25</td>
<td>1,270.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1,199.30</td>
<td>1,528.73</td>
<td>1,150.12</td>
<td>590.56</td>
<td>135.57</td>
<td>606.88</td>
<td>5,211.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>37.15</td>
<td>71.95</td>
<td>105.04</td>
<td>118.88</td>
<td>130.57</td>
<td>160.21</td>
<td>623.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>38.62</td>
<td>36.23</td>
<td>27.42</td>
<td>108.51</td>
<td>24.15</td>
<td>11.05</td>
<td>245.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td>45.66</td>
<td>44.20</td>
<td>164.82</td>
<td>4,862.17</td>
<td>5,209.84</td>
<td>17.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>302.54</td>
<td>716.38</td>
<td>498.36</td>
<td>593.35</td>
<td>1,088.71</td>
<td>864.98</td>
<td>4,064.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>650.15</td>
<td>775.07</td>
<td>344.80</td>
<td>53.88</td>
<td>186.62</td>
<td>51.84</td>
<td>2,062.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>17.85</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>33.58</td>
<td>15.36</td>
<td>79.62</td>
<td>44.05</td>
<td>205.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,045.11</td>
<td>2,287.81</td>
<td>777.25</td>
<td>2,545.43</td>
<td>1,928.08</td>
<td>2,432.80</td>
<td>11,016.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total SEA</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,270.08</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,734.39</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,211.79</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,302.31</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,931.44</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,279.22</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,909.79</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compile from OECD Creditor Reporting System (OECD, 2015).

Vietnam is the highest Japanese ODA recipient since 2009. Overall, Vietnam received US$ 11,016.48 million (or about 36.83%) of total Japanese ODA towards Southeast Asia. Indonesia and Myanmar received almost same amount, namely US$ 5,211.16 million and US$ 5,209.84 million respectively. The very significant amount has allocated to Myanmar in 2013, which has been increase almost 3000%, from US$ 164.82 million in 2012 to become US$ 4,862.17 million in 2013. This figure implies the importance of Myanmar in the eyes from Japanese government.

In connection to the share of Japanese ODA to promote governance and civil society (which is the main component of democracy assistance), the total amount

during the 2008 to 2013 period is US$ 281.72 million. Of that amount, about 42.32% or US$ 119.22 million allocated to Indonesia and as much as 20.82% or US$ 58.65 million allocated to Cambodia. These two countries is listed the main recipient of Japanese democracy assistance in terms of amount compare to other Southeast Asia country. In terms of Cambodia, it looks like there is a significant decreasing of Japanese democracy assistance allocation compare to 2008.

The data above implies that the involvement of Japan in order to promote governance and civil society in Southeast Asia countries need to be improved in several aspects. The next research will elaborate the case of democracy assistance activities in selected countries in order to find out the proper recommendation for Japanese democracy assistance improvement toward Southeast Asia countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total Amount</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camboja</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>19.37</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>58.65</td>
<td>20.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>105.63</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>119.22</td>
<td>42.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>25.23</td>
<td>8.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>12.58</td>
<td>4.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>24.06</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>27.34</td>
<td>9.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SEA</td>
<td>32.82</td>
<td>14.56</td>
<td>21.72</td>
<td>139.13</td>
<td>32.35</td>
<td>41.15</td>
<td>281.72</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If the two tables above compared, we may found that in general the total share of Japanese democracy assistance to the total ODA in the Southeast Asia countries is only about 0.94% in the last six years, equal to US$ 281.72 million. The highest share is received by Cambodia and Lao PDR with 4.62% and 4.04% of their Japanese ODA is allocated for democracy assistance activities respectively.

G. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the global context, the attention to democracy and its related issues could be studied by analyzing the total amount of financial support to democracy assistance. Between 2008 and 2013, the share of “governance and civil society” sector provided by the 28 members of OECD DAC comprises around 11.53% to 13.25% of total ODA. By considering that there are
more than eight sectors in ODA category, this share can be ranked as high.

Japan is the low performer in terms of amount and share of contribution to democracy assistance sector. Although Japan is the second largest aid providers, the share of Japan’s ODA to democracy assistance is only 2.72% for the last six years. The highest contribution of Japanese democracy assistance went to “public policy sector and administration management” which amounts to 5.79%, while the share of remaining components for supporting democracy consolidation is low. For example, legislature and political party receives 0%; media and free flow of information receives 0.08%; human rights receive 0.09%; women’s equality receives 0.38%; democracy and civil society receives 0.09%.

Southeast Asia is the main priority region for Japanese ODA policy, as stated in ODA Charter. The implementation of the policy reflected in the ODA allocation to Southeast Asia from 2008 to 2013

Table Error! No text of specified style in document.-1 Comparison of Japan’s ODA and Democracy Assistance in Southeast Asia, 2008 – 2013 (in US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ODA Amount</th>
<th>ODA % total</th>
<th>Democracy Assistance Amount</th>
<th>Democracy Assistance % country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camboja</td>
<td>1,270.08</td>
<td>4.25%</td>
<td>58.65</td>
<td>4.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5,211.16</td>
<td>17.42%</td>
<td>119.22</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>623.79</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
<td>25.23</td>
<td>4.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>245.98</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>17.42%</td>
<td>12.58</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4,064.32</td>
<td>13.59%</td>
<td>24.06</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2,062.36</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>205.78</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>2.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>11,016.48</td>
<td>36.83%</td>
<td>27.34</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total SEA</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,909.79</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>281.72</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.94%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compile from OECD Creditor Reporting System (OECD, 2015)
makeup 31% of all Japan’s ODA. Among the eleven Southeast Asia countries, nine are listed as Japanese ODA recipients, namely: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor Leste, and Vietnam. There is a significant shift of Japanese ODA distribution based on the target countries in the region where Myanmar has been ranked as a new priority. In 2013, the amount of Japanese ODA to Myanmar increased to 3000% compare with 2012.

The data show that Japan’s ODA are not designed in linear pattern with Japanese democracy assistance. For example, Myanmar and Indonesia receive about 17.42% each from Japan’s ODA targeted to the regions. But the allocation for democracy assistance for Myanmar and Indonesia is only 0.24% and 2.29% respectively. Also, Vietnam is considered as the biggest Japanese ODA recipient from 2008 to 2013 receiving 36.83% of Japan’s ODA. However, the allocation for democracy assistance to Vietnam is only 0.25%, marked as the second lowest.

The Japanese involvement in democracy assistance around the world can be considered minor compared to other donor countries, especially among the OECD DAC members. In relation with regional priority, Japanese ODA consistently place Southeast Asia as the main target for development assistance but with lesser compliance with supporting governance and civil society known as the core component of democracy assistance. While Japan has adopted new foreign policy strategy known as the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, including Southeast Asia region, there still remains a need and opportunity to increase Japan’s engagement in democratization process, either by promoting or protecting democracy.

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