AGENCY RELATIONSHIP IN CONTEXT OF BUDGETING IN THE NEW ORDER ERA (SOEHARTO ERA): EXECUTIVE WITH THE AUTHORITY AS A “PRODIGAL SON”

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ABSTRACT

Budgeting process is like the "black box" which is known only by the executive alone. The game room was played beautifully, like a Dutch football game which is beautiful and interesting to watch, so that the budget seems to side with the people, but in fact the budget is an artificial reality. This study pictured the executive like “the prodigal son” who marginalize the legislature. During the era of the new order, all the power over the budget is in the hands of the executive (the regent / mayor / governor) which is the extension of the central government (the president).

This study employed critical ethnography method, which is described and interpret the cultural systems and social groups. As a research method, critical ethnography has the typical process of a long observation of the social group that informants and researchers are active participant in the group. The finding of this study is that the executive-legislative relations agency in the context of budgeting process is like a mystery. The relationship of agent in the budgeting process in the new order, was dominated by the executive agency. In this context legislative access to budget policy’s is very limited, or even, none at all.

INTRODUCTION

There is a crawl aspirations of the people, but who determines the final result of the budget is the executive. People's aspirations did not affect the budget that has been made. This makes a very strong executive position, so that he himself would act arbitrarily, feudalistic, pretentious justification of its own power and gain (Winasa, The Chief Executive of Jembrana)

So far "mystery" is the right word to express the agency relationship in the new order era of local government. In this era agency relationship full of conflicts of interest, secrecy and confidentiality, which is known only by the budget actors who are the executive. However, it was very naive when the agency relationship that raises many questions that only revealed the extent of surface, without any further exploring to the root of the problem. I think understanding to the source of problems is essential. This can be done by observing the behavior of actors interact in the budget process, through interviews with the actors of the time or the writings of many scattered reveal this. Another thing you can do is to understand the way of thinking or being part of the budget actors (both the executive and legislative). Also, it can also be done by collecting information about people's interpretation of executive-legislative relations agency at that time. As expressed by Gillham (2004, 10) that in

qualitative research will be found a variety of evidence about what people say, what they do and how people perceive an action or event. Furthermore, he argued that the totality of the evidence could be the basis for researchers to explain the behavior of an agency relationship in accordance with an understanding of the budget actors.

This study employed critical ethnography method, which is described and interpret the cultural systems and social groups. This method is the result of the dialectical process, where at one point, there is dissatisfaction with the social class structure of society such as paternalism and racist, so that human in general as the main social actors cannot perform. And the other point, there are representation of human in general by a specific class and race. As a research method, critical ethnography has the typical process of a long observation of the social group that informants and researchers are active participant in the group. Researchers focus on the meaning of behavior, language and social interaction within the group. So that, researcher as a participant in the social group always critically examines the findings of the status quo that occurred in the group

In order to explore the facts of the new order era agency relationship, the data are useful and support the study, then analyzed with a holistic approach. As noted by Hammersley and Atkinson (1983, 10-11) that researchers can use different styles in analyzing the data obtained. Therefore, I use the evidence (the events) that are assembled into a scientific story to reveal the agency relationship in the context of local government budgets.

The comprehension above shows that the budget management in the new order is like the "black box" which is known only by the executive alone. As said by Kade Sulastri, a member of the legislature, that "in those days the budget allocation is known only by bureaucrats, while the public and the legislature was totally blind about the budget". "Black box" budget was the executive "game room", which because of the high self-interest, they tend to impose the people. The game room was played beautifully, like a Dutch football game which is beautiful and interesting to watch, so that the budget seems to side with the people, but in fact the budget is an artificial reality (Wildavsky and Caiden, 2004).

This study pictured the executive like the prodigal son who marginalize the legislature. During the era of the new order, all the power over the budget is in the hands of the executive (the regent / mayor / governor) which is the extension of the central government (the president). To be able to do so, all the laws are directed in such a way that there is no room for other stakeholders to speak.

NEW ORDER ERA AGENCY RELATIONS: THE KINGDOM AND COLONIALISM REINCARNATION

As we know, the agency relationship in the context of the budget is always interesting to study, especially in the government sector with such a broad stakeholder. Because, in fact the local government budget does not just belong to the executives, but also the interests of politicians (legislature), the people, the central government and even the wider community. As said by Wildavsky and Caiden (2004, xxvii):

    budgeting was interesting. Amazing but true … budgeting was the lifeblood of government, the medium through which flowed the essentials life support systems of public policy.
But it is really unbelievable that for thirty-two years the new order has been in power, the budget space was really only a mere executive realm. According to Winasa Gede, Jembrana Regent, said, "at that time all parties (other stakeholders) is only taken for granted of what the will of the executive". Ironically, according to the Regent, "in the new order, bureaucrats (executive) would only be served and would not serve, like a great lord in colonial or royal past before Indonesia was proclaimed." This statement triggered the initiation of this study. Furthermore, based on instinct, observational study was initiated by doing a flashback by studying the behavior of the kingdom agency that affect executive-legislative interaction in the New Order government.

As is known, in the 16th century before the arrival of foreigners, most of the regions of Indonesia consists of small countries that embrace the royal government system (Rahardja and Manurung, 2008: 345). At that time, the head of command was in the hands of the king who is the sole and absolute authority. In other words, the king act and rule as if God's representatives on earth. Thus, all decisions was in the hands of the king and the people must abide and obey every command of the king. While on the other hand, the people or the people trusted by the king had no right to change the decision of the king.

Agency relationship in the system began to appear when the king delegate some authority to the officials or the royal regent. However, as a feudalistic system, royal officials did not serve the public interest, but serve the interests of the king because the authority received was the gift of the king and not from the people. It also occurs in Jembrana Bali. As is known, according to archaeological evidence can be interpreted that the emergence of Jembrana community was around 6000 years ago. King and his followers are the people who come from ethnic Balinese Hindus and ethnic non-Balinese who are Muslims have built a palace as the seat of government named Puri Gede Jembrana in the early seventeenth century by I Gusti Made Yasa (ruler of Brangbang). Since the royal power is held by the King of Jembrana, I Gusti Gede Seloka, as happened in many other kingdoms in the archipelago, absolute rule was held by kings and nobility (www.jembrana.org.id).

The dominance of the nobility caste continues until the time of independence (ie the formation of the Indonesian state), just look at the list of names of former leaders (regent) of this area. Generally they come from the nobility such as Regent of Jembrana Autonomous Region Level II, for the first time chaired by Ida Bagus Gede Dosther from 1959 to 1967. Furthermore, the government held by Drs. Ida Bagus Ardana (August 26, 1980 - August 27, 1990), then Regent Ida Bagus Indugosa, SH, who served for two terms starting from August 27, 1990 - August 27, 1995 and from August 27, 1995 - August 27, 2000.

Again, this study has shown that these officials are from the nobility or priyayi group that has high social status, which distinguishes them from other communities. This is due to the power received from the king gave them a very important position to take the decisions referred to as "elite" rulers (Suwarno, 1994: 10). With the honorable position of that of the "elite", make their mental when implementing the government tends to behave like a king which is to be served. This has become the characteristic of the royal officials who can act at will against the people, as performed by the king.

Back to the past, many studies show mental feudalism continues to grow and flourish in the Dutch colonial period. This is due to the focus of the Netherlands at the time was the smooth deposit of tax and tribute, not a mental improvements that affect the systems of
government officials. In addition, the proliferation of feudalism attitude is because they who are to govern during the colonial period generally comes from the nobility or from the priyayi group. According to Dwiyanto (2006, 44), in the kingdom, the person appointed to be a royal officials are the ones who have allegiance and loyalty to the king. In other words, if the officials are not loyal then it will be removed from office and replaced by someone more loyal. Thus "monoloyalty" comes as an appreciation of the position, salary or reward which the king gives to his servants and a gift that can be withdrawn at any time by the king (Suwarno, 1994).

According to Dwiyanto (2006, 12), officials "monoloyalty" at the time, measured by seeing the king at the specified times, which is now better known as "face to face management ". They went to the king by presenting tributes and taxes that are drawn from folk, where the offerings are to meet the needs of the king and royal family members. Suwarno (1994, 30) suggests that the authorities use the money withdrawn from the people for the king's personal interests. Thus, the greater the tribute and taxes given the greater the king’s attention to the official because is considered very loyal (see research Dwiyanto, 2006). Therefore, it can be said that this mental caused royal officials to be unaccountable to the public and away from public interests.

Other cultures that also affect the agency relationship in the context of the executive and legislative budget during the new order in Indonesia is a culture of paternalism. The things that reflect the relationship of father and son (paternalism). In this cultural form by Mulder (1985, 13), a subordinate with a superior position is equal with the position relationship between the child with his father in the concept of Java. In this context, a child must honor his father manifested in polite speech, hesitate to oppose the will of his parents, and every action must receive the blessing of the father, while on the other hand, subordinates receive protection from the father. According to Blau and Scott (1987), culture of paternalism flourished because of the influence of feudalism, which had a big influence in shaping the agency relationship in local governance.

CENTRALISTIC RELATIONSHIP: A NEW FORM FEUDALISM

In the period between 1966 until mid 1999 was a period in which the budget is in the cage of centralization. Centralization cage is a new form of feudalism. In this case, the central government is a king, in which everyone must submit and adhere to all policies that are made, including budget policy, is largely determined by the center (the President). Meanwhile, at the regional level, the ruler is the extension of the central government statutory (Law) No.5 of 1974 is the governor, regent or mayor. With a system of hierarchical organization, the regent / mayor is subordinated to the governor who is also subordinated to central government. Therefore, in carrying out their duties, local authorities are under the supervision and control of the governor and the central government. The model hierarchy is consistent with the Weberian concept which says that the hierarchy of top officials has more power than the officials at the level below. Based on the hierarchy system, then the lower hierarchy has no authority to give opinions, suggestions, let alone against the power hierarchy above (see Ahmad and Mansoor, 2002; Wibawa, 2005; Thoha, 2005). That is, executives, both in cities and counties, submissive and obedient to the governor and the central government.
Likewise, the forms of agency relationship in the local government to follow the prevailing system, namely the executive and legislative work in order of hierarchy pattern, where the executive and legislative branch as the top leadership is below (Wibawa, 2005: 5). This social context, legitimated by Law No. 5 of 1974 (UU No. 5/1974), stated that the legislature is part of the local government, which meant that the legislature is part of the executive and not a separate entity from the government. This condition indicates that the executive is dominant (powerful). Meanwhile, the legislature and the people who are not located within the hierarchy have no power (powerless) at all and is regarded as "alien". Jembrana Regent Gede Winasa commented that, "hierarchical lines from top to bottom, whether related to the powers and responsibilities, the tip was in the hands of the executive. The most powerful executives. "He continued that, "when a legislative act, just go with the flow controlled by the executive". This is new style feudalism phenomenon that appears in the form of centralization of power.

By instilling logo-centrism centralization, false consciousness developed against the dominated classes. This condition, according to Thomas Hobbes, is like a monster "leviathan" that cannot be prevented from power authority. As Newton's law that requires a world governed by a stable system, in which the regularities and the balance created due to there is a power center that is universal and unchanging that govern them. This cosmological analogy in the social system, required a centralized power, in which maintained social stability and stable institutions (Piliang, 2005: 352).

During the reign of the new order with the Law No. 5 in 1974 (UU No.5/1974) as the cornerstone of central and local relations, there have been injustice relations, both politically and economically. Politically, it seems that local government is more a tool than a tool center and the decentralized autonomous regions. Parliament is supposed to be the holder and the responsible regional autonomy is made part of the local government more accountable to central government. Head area, practically speaking, is not determined by the parliament because the candidates will be chosen by Parliament must get approval first from the center. Candidates chosen by the parliament is elected by the central one of which, without being tied to the local election results ranking. The view area of the figure head of the desired area is ignored. Meanwhile, economic injustice, appears when the central government to drain almost the entire wealth of the region. For example, in Aceh and Riau are rich in natural resources, but many residents were forced to live in shacks. Meanwhile, because of the poor, the gold-rich Irian Jaya, which many people die of hunger, and in Buton which is the largest producer of asphalt, revealing a picture of the many roads that have not been on the tarmacs, at least when compared to roads in Java (Mahfud, 2000: 5). Winasa, then, explains the social context behind this clutter. He said:

When creating legislation based on the attribution of authority, governments often manipulate and corrupt the materials, which made the basic principles drowned out by the various implementing regulations. This then lead to centralization of power that by time to time became massive and feudal.

Winasa statement about the culture of feudalism executive can be proved on the mechanism of budget planning. Evidence suggests that the budget policy from planning to implementation is the "play area" the executive, means must be in accordance with the guidance center. As expressions of Made Sudantra, Head of Industry, Trade, and
Cooperatives (Diperindagkop), Jembrana regency, that: "for over thirty years of the executive that makes the budget plan, in accordance with the interests that represent the center or centers, without any interference another ". Informants indicate that the policy statement in favor of the budget a priority orientation of the central government executive. Meanwhile the interests of the people were displaced by the interests of other parties who represent the aspirations of the ruling powers. Although since the 1980's has applied a bottom-up planning which is a crawl mechanism for people's aspiration to create a budget plan at the start from the grassroots level (village). But the reality turned out differently, planning is not implemented in earnest, as more colored by the aspirations of executives rather than the interests of society. As disclosed Wibawa (2005, 6):

in the planning process ... aspirations often eliminated or at least can only be articulated and aggregated subtly, for example through direct lobbying from community leaders against the government. Their aspirations, the "constitutionally" should be channeled through the institution of the House of Representatives (DPRD), in fact it is difficult to be formulated as a policy accommodated. All the plans made by the president or the government.

If the legislature were consulted, it is just an act to manipulate people (pseudo-participation), to indicate the occurrence of democracy in the making of policy, especially fiscal policy, but it was all false. For Winasa, Regent of Jembrana, revealed that:

If during the new order no parliament, then to me it just to show the world that in Indonesia there is democracy, but really all it is only a pseudo democracy. They are not empowered at all.

Winasa, added:

New Order stuck on the idea that it should be set aside to build the integration of democracy. The new democracy will be opened if the economy is strong. Which underlies the appearance of authoritarian rule under Suharto. Democracy is built is a mere formality because the substance of democracy is not democratic. There are democratic institutions like Parliament, the House of Representatives, parliament, political parties, mass organizations and the press, but all co-opted in such a way and pressed not to differ from the view of government. Elections held every five years, but with a full engineering process and cheating ... so yes, in the MPR and DPR planted the hands of political aspirations of the executive so that the container community to be very barren and unable to exercise effective control of the government ... This is all built on the basis "for the sake of economic development".

The above conditions, with more enthusiasm clarified again by Winasa, that:

There is a crawl aspiration of the people, but who determines the final result is the executive budget. People's aspirations did not affect the budget that has been made. This makes a very strong executive position, so that he himself would act arbitrarily, feudalistic, quasi-power and get his own justification.

This impression reflects the basic character of executives who tend not to want a consolidation mechanism. Executives wanted to show his power and did not want to share power with the legislative especially with the people. Therefore, according to Wibawa (2005, 5), for the executive to listen to the voice of the people are channeled through the legislature is something that is impossible, wasting time and inefficient.

Therefore it can be said that, the whole mechanism of planning and managing the budget and implemented strictly in accordance with the guidance center. Implemented a centralized budget management means the entire result of the economic resources brought to the central area, then center that determines all the needs of the region. Ironically, there is absolutely no resistance to the local government (the executive) to the centralized resource management. In fact, local political elites to support this action, because they personally
benefit economically, as given discretion to use excessive power over the centralization of political and economic support (Pratikno, 2002: 33), and increase career and position in the future (Wibawa, 2005: 5).

According to Mills (1999), executive power in the new order seemed an implementation of "elite theory". The reason is, because the power was in some group or certain people, such as executive and his cronies who have no accountability to the people (Considine, 1983: 139). Based on this theory, the executive gives a greater share of attention to the opinions of officials upon it in accordance with the hierarchy, rather than the aspirations of the legislature. This is in accordance with the opinion expressed by Sudantra, Chief Diperindagkop, that:

> More preferred are the interests of "center" of the central government and central officials. In order to support the continuity of his reign, the center provides a variety of facilities to almost all indigenous institutions, community leaders and local officials.

This statement describes the behavior of executives (center) who do anything to please the local officials (the executive), in order to maintain their loyalty. The justification for this attitude executive produced through imagination about the creation of a just and prosperous Indonesia, through the symbols of development, political stability, national unity and uniformity of life for people in every way. As expressions of Dwiyanto (2006, 7) that in practice the "elites" manipulate the people with the lure of symbolization, which is in the interest of the state, development and national stability.

The symbols above is a form of power that forced in a subtle format that is language, according to Pierre Bourdieu in Outline of a Theory of Practice referred to as a form of symbolic violence (symbolic violence) is a special form of violence using language mechanisms. Symbols indicate a disguised form of daily activities. According to him (1990, xxi), violence is a symbol of violence in its very smooth, the violence imposed on social agents without inviting resistance, on the contrary, even invite conformity because it was getting social legitimacy because its shape is very smooth. The concept of the symbol violence leads us toward social mechanisms, in which the interlocked relation with the communication of power relations. A power system tends to be maintained by dominating (distorting) the media of communication, the language used in communications, the meanings that are exchanged, and the interpretation of the meaning of the meaning, this is called a symbol of domination (Thompson, 1984: 42).

In the process of domination actually happens a symbolic force that is very subtle, but the man who dominated symbolically unaware of the existence of coercion or accept coercion as something that is rightfully so. So, language, meaning and symbol systems implanted in the minds of the powers of individuals through a mechanism that is hidden from consciousness. As well as subtly as the central executive to the legislature to impose his beliefs and the people through a variety of subtle indoctrination and coercion that the centralization of all things, including budget policy, is something good, noble and true in order for the interest of the state. Meanwhile, those who are controlled / despised as bad, evil, guilt, subversive and criminal.

The evidence above shows how the centralization of cultural relations is the new style of feudalism, and so closely with the executive's behavior. Culture that emphasizes rights
rather than obligations it has made, "the executive acting as a host rather than a public servant. Sadly the situation the new order ", commented Regent of Jembrana, I Gede Winasa.

That is the picture of agency relationship in the context of the budget in the new order which was highly centralized, reinforced by the culture of feudalism has led to situations where the legislature access to the black box budget policy is very limited. Opportunity and the space owned by the legislature does not go as desired. Thus, extending a relationship that does not draw (unequal relationship) between the executive power with the legislative marginalized. According to financial experts and political imbalances in executive-legislative relations raises various problems (see Booth, 1989; Devas, 1989; Thoha, 2005). Therefore, this study will explore the agency relationship the new order in the form of a metaphor from the point of understanding the various informants, such as the metaphor of "beg the direction and guidance" and the metaphor of "Rubber Stamp", which is the image of executive-legislative interaction.

**Legislative play: "Please Directives and Instructions"

According to the concept of governance, the legislature elected by the people to contribute to providing a critique of accountability and oversight of public financial management, as well as participating in the system of checks and balances (Santiso and Belgrano, 2004). This means that the people through the agency overseeing the management and implementation of the budget which is run by the executive. Light of the agency relationship, the legislature elected to act on behalf of the people (the principal). That is, in carrying out legislative duties should oversee the agency. All the doings of the executive in policy-making should always be in the corridor direction and legislative oversight (Mitnick, 1973; Moe, 1984; Lupia and McCubbins, 2000).

In contrast to the above concept, the new order of government running the concept of regional government with reference to the Law no. 5 in 1974, where it is under the legislative power of the executive (head region) which is an extension of the single authority (the President). This condition occurs, since in practice the legislative members are selected in advance by a special research process (litsus) which followed closely by executives before the election, even many of the legislators who are appointed directly by the executive. Some legislators, who were appointed, were regional civil servants who of course are subordinate to the head area. So, do not be surprised when it is said legislative positions in the new order is subordinate to the executive, so they will do anything to satisfy his superiors.

In budget policy, the executive becomes entitled to institute a super power that determines all things, both the formulation and determination of budget allocations, while the legislature did not have space in the process. Legislative position is very weak, can even be said to be barren. As expressions of Nyusundari Ketut, a member of the legislature, "we are just accessories rule, do not have any function. All matters are dealt with the executive ". When viewed in the context of the above, then surely the legislature did not represent the public interest, which served only the interests of one person that is a single master.

New order system is made so that "as if" there is democracy that is characterized by the existence of the legislature as a counterweight to the executive. However, as noted earlier, the "desirability" and "security" legislators in the hands of the head area, even the welfare of the legislature in the form of salary and other facilities determined by the regional head. All
this led to legislative submissive and obedient to all executive decisions. They do not dare to act to carry out their duties, such as validate the rules, give opinions, as well as overseeing the budget, if not get the blessing and guidance in advance from the regional head. Therefore, any legislative action is always accompanied by the sweet words "ask directions" or "ask directions" (Putra and Arif, 2001: 41). As told by Ketut Nyusundari, a member of the legislature, that:

At that time, we only approve the budget course, everything depends on the instructions of bureaucrats. Therefore, if something is unclear we pray for guidance and direction from the executive, before deciding the budget. The executive are the one who determines everything.

He, then, goes on to comment that "many of the legislature who actually visited the executive, to ask for opinions on what to do about the budget". This picture shows just how dependent the legislative to the executive, both material and non material. Metaphorical description of legislative action that is always "ask directions" or "ask directions" reinforced by a culture of paternalism that developed in the concept of Javanese society, a form of relationship "father" and "son" (Kuntowijoyo, 2004; Dwiyanto, 2006). In the hierarchy, the one who occupy the top position acts as a father and the subordinate acts as children. That is, the culture of paternalism see the executive as the father as occupying the top positions and legislative acts as a "child". The relationship between parent and child is the superior and inferior relationships. Children or inferiors must respect the parent or superiors. As the "father", the executive provides protection to "children" in the form of his status and rank with all amenities. Giving is a privilege "child" which is a determinant of social status in society. Consequently, by granting privileges, then the "child" must be loyal and voluntarily fulfill all the commandments "father" who later became a source of legitimacy of power in society (Mulder, 1985: 23). In relation to the "father" and "child", each party to get his wish so hard to say who is blackmailing whom or who take advantage of anyone (Jackson and Pye, 1978: 34).

This picture shows the new order with a culture of paternalism is very involved in executive-legislative relations agency. Culture of paternalism is reinforced with a system of feudalism in the form of centralization of power led to the legislative body that should oversee the implementation of the executive budget, reversed into the executive who oversees and controls the legislature in making budget policy. The powerlessness of the legislature in carrying out his rights in order to realize its functions led to a very weak position of Parliament, they just act as a "rubber stamp", as the following explanation.

"Rubber Stamp": Marginalized Legislative Work

"Rubber Stamp"! This Meaning is what the researchers captured from the interaction with the informant when they described the role of the new order legislature. As the view of one of the staff of local government that describes how easily the proposed executive budget proposal for approval by Parliament, because these institutions are only approve the budget and rules without a lot of questions. As Vishnu's comments, one of the former member of parliament of the new order era, that:

I think it is very clear that our position are only appendages of a system built by the government's new order, back then, we have no power at all, we were just called to sit down, shut up, listen and ultimately approve all the proposal of the executive ... I think the role is similar to a rubber stamp, we are there to legitimate the government's wishes.
The powerlessness of the legislature, appears to be supported by the social order (social settings) that is authoritarian or neo-feudalism is backed by the military. The powerlessness of the legislature is due to the strong position of the central government (the president).

When investigated again, the accumulation of power in the hands of regional executives in the New Order era (the period between 1966 until mid-1999) is an outcome of the executive power (president) at the country level. President (Suharto) as head of the executive branch has enormous power and dominant, so called as the sole ruler. In running the government received support from the dominant political force and military power. This impression is captured from the comments Winasa, Regent of Jembrana, that "the government bureaucracy in Indonesia is military power and Golkar". Both these powers abide and obedient to the President, in governance they have a huge impact on every level of government to the remote villages. As noted by Priyatmoko (2005, 85) that, "not just supervision that was carried out, but further than that, strategic positions in government was capitalized by the new order for the ruling regime occupied by military personnel".

In fact, a strategic position to be occupied by civil society as much as possible the military contributed to selecting, for example through the mechanism of special study or the obligation to follow certain courses, such as the Nation Defense. Furthermore, Priyatmoko (2005, 85) and Pratikno (2002, 33) added that central and local officials who have occupied positions are also influenced by a variety of ways, such as coordination or upgrading, upgrading by using symbols of unity, national stability, in order to benefit state and development. Under these circumstances Winasa Regent, later, joked that:

Even almost all the regional head and chief or head of strategic agencies were in the hands of the military. Democracy which puts people's sovereignty is not much practiced. Meanwhile, democracy, according to a perspective of power nuanced by engineering for the benefit of the ruler was very clear during the reign of the new order.

From the above comprehension it appears that the role of Golkar and the military have been displacing the position of the legislature. Legislature cannot exercise its function as a representative of the people in determining the policies of the budget. All these functions have been carried out by subordinates President who was in the Golkar party and military. On the other hand, the position of the legislature as a symbol of the supremacy of civilian institutions which are supposed to represent the people in the political arena of governance and budget management were displaced by the role of the armed forces, which represent the aspirations of the ruler. This Form of authoritarian control model was run strictly by placing the hierarchy of government aligned with the hierarchy of the territorial command, so the military can observe at close the governance at every level down to villages.

The situation is worsened by the threat of recall for legislators vowel (voiced public interest), conducted by the executive (Fuad, 2000: 24). As expressed by Nyoman Suryadi, Head of Education Jembrana, that, "if there is a legislative who talk too much will be replaced by others, for blocking the budget approval that “was said” to impede development. Budget approval should run smoothly and instantly approved, in which all orders come from above ". Based on this understanding, executives tend to avoid legislative that are critical of any policy that has been made, because they tends to create work inefficiencies.
On the other hand, in the new order, the executive agency was filled by scholars or the selected priyayi community, so that the executive branch has established itself as a pioneer of modernization, or consider themselves (and are considered by society) as the most knowing, most competent and most capable to formulate policies that will be achieved and the best for the community. Jero Gede, customary village chief, commented that: "The executive of the new order era was filled with smart people and intellect. So don’t be surprised if they decide everything ". This way of view was embedded and rooted in a long period of time, which is then institutionalized as a system that is difficult to change. As expressed by Foucault that there is an inseparable relation between discourses, the underlying knowledge, as well as relations of power hidden behind it, which is a product of the practice of power. According to him, action, knowledge and discourse formation is a product of the power play (Piliang, 2004: 223-224). This means that the discourse of modernization and the executive as a pioneer institution that knows all things deliberately developed and implanted a long time by the authorities in order to perpetuate power.

In line with that in mind, C. Wright Mills in his work "The Power Elite" (1956) pointed out that the power to control and lead the activities of people is concentrated in the hands of a small number of people (Sanderson, 2003: 330). They are an elite choice of homogeneous and united, which is at the top of the pyramid of society. The members of the elite from the three main areas of life, which are executive, large employers, and top military leaders. "Elite" so named by Mills, is a "military-industrial complex". Regardless of the diversity of members of the elite who have been pushed into a variety of often conflicting interests, Mills saw them as the holder of a fundamental unit of interest. The similarity of fundamental importance that it has created a psychological unity of the group, with the result of ideological unity of the world view of social, political, and economic. They became a group that supports the ruling elites in control of the state.

In addition, the exclusivity of the executive seems supported by the device information which is controlled entirely by the executive, while the legislature is very poor on information. According to Santiso and Belgrano (2004, 6):

The executive branch overwhelmingly dominates the budget process and legislatures tend to act merely as rubber stamps. Excessive executive discretion in public budgeting has not only hindered the consolidation of mechanisms of self-restraint in budget policy making, but also has circumvented of neutralized the few that existed.

Therefore, it can be said that in this era, executives do not want to share information with legislators because it is an indispensable ingredient in preparing arguments for the formulation of budget policy. As is known, completeness, accuracy and timeliness of data is an expensive"stuff", therefore in each of the sessions of the discussion of budget policy agenda, the legislature can not give arguments as well as the executive (head area). This condition causes the legislature at the time of the trial only give agreement comments, without any criticism. For this, Made Sudantra, one of the Head of Jembrana, said that "the situation at that time was that the legislature just stamps it". So the expression as a "rubber stamp" arises, because these institutions were only providing stamp endorsement on the policy proposals put forward by the executive budget (Wibawa, 2005: 13).

In other words, the view that the leadership has always acted properly, the leader cannot be blamed, for so long has been built. Conversely, a subordinate is considered not able
to translate the desire of the leader and the various attitudes that marginalize subordinates continue to be developed. As a result, the legislature in making budget policy endorsed only what is already formulated by the executive. Therefore, a rubber stamp inherent in the legislative body was a fact that must be accepted. As expressed by Made Sudantra, showing the marginalization of legislature was "budget approval was not hard, because it was only passed directly and no questions were asked by the legislature".

Thus the institutional executive-legislative relations, as described above, continuously take place during the three decades that tend to be the target of power, and eventually began to feel the need for reform. Efforts to reform gave birth to a desire to try to introduce a paradigm model of relationship form that is more nurturing the society. This paradigm wants to return the voice of the people which is channeled through legitimate institutions under the laws of the legislature.

ERA NEW ORDER: THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL INEQUALITIES THAT PROMOTE RELATIONS AGENCY

The above description shows that the government new order deserves to be called an authoritarian and militaristic government. Authoritarian and militaristic government were the one reinforce and enforced by the feudal life style and paternalistic, or paternalism, which traditionally applies in the Indonesian society in general.

In such cases, ethnicity and religious beliefs as a social and political force are maintained and developed by the government to support the stability of the new order of government and authorities has consciously or not shift into support for the stability of President Suharto and his cronies. It was later developed as the powers are absolute individuals, which is concentrated in the hands of one person (President Soeharto and his family). Absolute power is corrupt power, whether social, economic, political, and moral. For that reason, justification (justification) or the justifications made by using symbols (unity, development, stability and justice) and the metaphors which are relevant by officials in both religious ceremonies and social rituals.

In the new order era there is no equality of agency relationship, there is a social hierarchy or hierarchy established through various forms of regulation and political policies, as well as the provision of facilities and privileges to the military, officials and bureaucrats, and the parties supporting the government. As the result, we can be clearly distinguished between the ruling (with different privileges), people with no authority or ordinary people (who have to serve the ruling).

In the new order there is no equality agencies, both socially, legally or law, and culture. Inequality is manifested mainly in the political and economic life of the citizens of Indonesia. Although Indonesia recognizes itself as a democracy, the Western world and a number of other countries classifies Indonesia as a country with a totalitarian government, the same s type with countries in Latin America is also controlled by the military (Piliang, 2005). The main principle of democracy, namely the degree of individual equality and freedom, and the ruler with the consent of the people, not materialized during the reign of the new order. During the New Order era, that there is rule by the military, the patron or father, and cronies of the president. They see shades of the new order era of Indonesian culture as a culture are
feudalistic, authoritarian, militaristic, and paternalistic economic system that is supported by cronyism.

Agency relationship that goes on in the new order era regardless of his physical achievements is remarkable, in fact nothing more than a discourse of madness. As Foucault said, in the madness of people deceive themselves. If true a false image of the insane demands (arbitrariness of image), so he imprisons himself in the circle false consciousness. Insanity is the fragmentation of the soul, where the passion brought to the point of blindness. It is blindness that has guided trips construction of the new order regime. Accompanied by an uncontrollable desire to blindness will lead everyone to the Machiavellian. The paradigm of violence eventually became the paradigm of development. Agency relationship that occurs is supported by calculations, calculation and management of precision, but not fitted with a healthy soul (reason). Agency relationship demanded not by the wisdom and sincerity, but by the desires and passions that there is no control. Projects that are built based more on a desire to meet the desires of pride and prestige of the ruler, like the tallest, most luxurious shopping center, the largest golf course, and so on. The passion of pride, therefore is in contradiction with the social conditions and aspirations, in the end be a boomerang and killed the nation itself through various forms of violence.

Agency relationship in the era of the new order is characterized by territorial or geopolitical politics, which has created a cultural totalitarianism, the culture of centralized power, centralized, which created in it various forms of cultural uniformity that does not respect plurality, difference, and the locality. Culture is constructed based on the principle of binary opposition. Within each segment is a process of elimination (exclusion), isolation (alienation), and exclusion (marginalization). From the description above, we can say that the new order era of logo-centrism is selfishness. That is, only the executive (center) is always true.

It can be seen that during the New Order era, the climate of dialogue is not created, there is a man seen as a statistic, as the numbers, as a commodity that does not consider her feelings. This way of thinking is contrary to Mikhail Bakhtin who argued that attempts an understanding of society and culture (including political culture), the most important effort is to understand how human beings as subjects, with all his feelings, and not as soulless objects. Because, as an object, only knowledge that can be obtained (Piliang, 2005, 182). Therefore, in an agency relationship, the most important thing to understand is an understanding between agents and principals.

**SUMMARY**

Executive-legislative relations agency in the context of the budget is like a mystery of budget management in the new order, because the relationship is dominated by the executive agency. Legislative access to budget policy’s “black box” is very limited, or even, none at all.

In addition, the system in such a way as to make the new order "as if" there is democracy that is characterized by the existence of the legislature as a counterweight to the executive. However, because of "security" legislators in the hands of the head area, causing the legislature to be submissive and obedient to all executive decisions. Therefore, every action must always be accompanied by the sweet words "please landing" or "please clue", as a result of legislative work only as a "rubber stamp" or "rubber stamp" the budget, there are
no other jobs. Apparently, that was the most appropriate metaphor to describe the role of the legislature the new order.

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