ABSTRACT: Policy on the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) program has sparked much debate between BRT administrators and public transportation administrators. This dispute has hindered the operations of BRT in the Mamminasata region from working effectively and efficiently. The aim of this research is to discover the institutionalized reciprocity between government and non-government players in BRT policy. This research utilizes qualitative design. In order to explore in depth the dimensions of reciprocal relationship between the government and non-government in the implementation of BRT transport policy, this research uses case study. Results of this research show that the reciprocal relationship developed by government groups with non-governmental groups in BRT-implementation policy differs according to the activities, sector, and scope of expertise of each actor involved. In addition, the findings of this research show that actors in BRT policy partook in continuous and democratic dialog in determining expenses paid and benefits reaped by both parties to the aim of improving the effectiveness of the Trans-Mamminasata BRT program.

Keywords: Reciprocity, Government, Non Government, BRT Policy, Mamminasata

INTRODUCTION

City transportation is a primary component of an urban social system. The complexity of transportation systems in cities is much greater than those in rural areas mainly due to the continuous growth of population numbers in urban areas, the increasing number of motorized vehicles exceeding road capacity, and the behavior of pedestrians that ignore traffic rules. In addition, urban communities have greater mobility than rural communities. This is mainly a consequence of more rapid social, economic, and demographic progress in urban areas relative to rural areas, and because most people in urban communities consider mobility as a right. [1]

The density of transport in urban areas has resulted in public transport becoming the primary alternative for people to get from one place to another within a city, either by public transport vehicles or private vehicles that are bound to fixed, regular routes. Public transit exists as a public service to provide safe, quick, affordable transportation to the general public. The fundamental purpose of public transport is a means of accessing workplaces, shopping centers, tourist attractions, or meet other socio-economic needs.[2]

City transport brings with it structural issues, along with the issues of process and proper value calculation. These issues are the reasons behind the complexity of urban transportation. These city transportation issues, thus require public policy intervention, namely city transport policy.

The state plays an important role in the implementation of city transport. Developing countries in particular cannot rely on the private sector to develop and manage transportation in cities. Political and economic changes resulting in the minimization of the role of the state in reality give rise to many problems such as service quality that is inevitably linked to the ability to pay for said services and not out of respect for the rights of citizens. Companies provide services to the public only when there is potential to make profit, and the company cannot be held responsible for the fate of citizens that can not access public services [3]. The responsibility lies with the state through public administration [4].

This implies that the state must maintain a central position in the implementation of public services. This requires the state must be capable of designing, adopting, and implementing sound public policy, including transport policy. What is meant by “transport policy” is the choice of purpose and when to act -- or not to act -- in response to public concerns. A study that positioned the government central to the process of implementation and institutionalization of reciprocal relationship relationships with institutionalized social actors that hold extensive interests in society is the State-Centric Model. [5]. Theoretically, the State-Centric model states that the state is at the center of policy-making processes, but implementation of said policies is executed through reciprocal relationship relationships/collaboration with government and non-government actors through various forms of corporatism and social relationships. [6].

Related to the concept introduced above, at the moment the Provincial Government of South Sulawesi is facing the challenge of effective public transport policy implementation, specifically for policies on the implementation of BRT in the Mamminasata region. The complexity of public transport in the urban region of Mamminasata is linked primarily to the population growth levels and high number of motorized vehicles. The population in the Mamminasata region increased from 2.06-million in 2003 to 2.4-million in 2013 [7]. However, repairs and improvement of transport infrastructure, roads in particular, were not comparable to the increase of privately-owned motor vehicles. To improve mobility and accessibility of public transport in Maminsasa, the Indonesian government (Ministry of Transportation) has provided 15 Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) units since 2014 with another 30 units planned for deployment. Based on the writer’s observations of the impact of the presence of BRT, in Maminsasa BRT is currently facing operational issues primarily related to BRT bus lane traffic. Currently, BRTs in
Maminasata still share the same roads as other vehicles including other public city transport (peta-peta). The writer assumes that, theoretically, the challenges of BRT transport implementation in Maminasata can be solved by either the Central Government or Local Government through an institutionalized reciprocity with non-government parties, the entirety of said relationship organized with the interests of the public at the forefront. The involvement of local government and non-state parties in BRT policies in Makassar begins from policy-making to the execution of BRT policy implementation in Maminasata. In order to understand and analyze reciprocity formed between government and non-government parties in the implementation of BRT transport policies in Maminasata, South Sulawesi. This problem can be formulated in the form of the following research question: “Can the government form institutionalized reciprocity with non-government actors in the policy-making of BRT in Maminasata, South Sulawesi?” The aim of this research is to know what institutionalized reciprocity the government has with non-government actors in BRT policy in the Maminasata area of South Sulawesi.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of reciprocal relationship in governance theory refers to the principle of the civic minimum. This principle states: “thos citizens who share in the social product have an obligation to make a productive contribution back to the community in return” [8]. This emphasis on reciprocal relationship, according to Bruni [9], is a praise of heterogeneity, that society works when different people are able to cooperate in many different ways. This can be applied in the context of BRT policy, and understood that BRT policy will run when the invested parties are able to work together in many different ways. Further, Bruni [9] explains: Civil life is essentially a matter of reciprocity. Cooperation, friendships, contracts, facts, family, and even conflict all have unique relationships with one another, yet they all share the common characteristic that they are all forms of reciprocal relationship. Civil society works if and when different forms of reciprocal relationship are seen as co-dependent and not competitive or function as substitutes to other forms of reciprocal relationship.

Kolm and Bruni [9] defines reciprocity as “gift or favour motivated by another gift”. The three forms of reciprocity are: (A) the reciprocity of the contract or ‘cautious’, (b) the reciprocity of friendship or ‘philia’, and (c) the ‘unconditional’ reciprocity. Bruni [9] uses the concept of civil reciprocity which is a positive relationship that is easily translated into cooperation, thus reciprocity and cooperation are one in the same. Bruni simplifies reciprocity into two forms, these are: ‘left-side’ (altruism or gift) and ‘right-side’ (contract or interests).

RESEARCH METHODS

This study used a qualitative design with case study as its research method. With the intention of exploring in depth all activities for the implementation of BRT transportation policy in the Mamminsata region of South Sulawesi that involve reciprocity with non-state entities, this research is focused on institutionalized reciprocity between the government and non-state players based on decision input allowed to non-state actors, negotiation and bargaining about means of goal completion, and the burden of costs that non-state actors bear. The location of this research was in the urban area of Mamminsata of South Sulawesi. Urban Mamminsata covers the District of Maros, the city of Makassar, District of Sungguminasa, and District of Takalar. Analysis of data in this study followed the general qualitative systematic procedure, namely the interactive model of Huberman and Miles [7].

RESEARCH RESULTS

Institutionalized reciprocity between the state and non-state parties in the implementation of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) policy in Trans-Mamminsata, South Sulawesi involves state actors that are divided into Regional Work Units according to their nature and function. For example, the Ministry of Transportation, Communication and Informatics, specifically the Head of the Department of Transportation are considered as an actor/institution that holds an important role in the success of the operations of the BRT program. This institution is also known for birthing transportation model designs that are planned for operation in the city of Makassar, such as the Smart Transportation program. However, a portion of the community also view this institution as the reason behind the ineffectiveness of the BRT program due to unpreparedness or indifference, for example not providing subsidies for BRT operations costs and infrastructure costs. Failure to utilize bureaucratic instruments in determining productive contributions to the implementation of BRT Trans Maminasata policy is also evident in the absence of coordination between the main institutions in South Sulawesi Provincial Government and the Government of Makassar, in this case the Department of Transportation, Communication and Information. Both of these institutions lack coordination in the determining of route stops and in the regulation of public transportation vehicles.

In the policy Maminasata BRT in Urban Area, the main actors involved in the implementation of BRT are grouped into two categories: (1) State actors, which include: South Sulawesi Governor; Head of the Department of Transportation, Communication and Information of South Sulawesi; Makassar Mayor; Head of the Department of Transportation, Communication and Information Makassar; politicians active in the Regional and Central Governments; Makassar City Traffic Police. DAMRI (public company) as a technical implementation unit of the Ministry of Transport. (2) Non-state actors, which include: Civil society, manifested in the form of Non-Governmental Organizations and other independent institutions. Private sector (entrepreneurs, contractors, suppliers, etc.) Research organizations which are groups of transportation experts from universities and transportation consultants, community leaders, public transport organizations and newspaper media.

Non-state actors appear to have varying degrees of involvement in BRT policy-making. This is consistent with the theory described by Howlett and Ramesh (1995) that the actors involved in cooperation efforts developed by the
government in the implementation of city transportation policy differs according to its scope of activities and fields of expertise. Civil society as manifested in non-government agencies such as NGOs and other independent institutions generally show very low levels of involvement in the management of BRT public transport in the city of Makassar. The private sector (transport companies, contractors, suppliers, etc.) has an economic and business interest in BRT policy. This means that economically they are local capitalists that prioritize economic motives in pursuing activities. However, the results of this research showed that the private sector was only active for a few periods in the implementation of BRT transportation in Makassar. Member companies of the Public Transport Organization (Organda) and public transport drivers are the segment of the private sector that are most involved in the implementation of BRT. Other private sector segments only act as executors, while regulation and policy monitoring is conducted by the Department of Transportation in Makassar or in other words self-managed activities.

At the moment, there is no participation of the private sector in management activities outside of providing input to the government asking that extra attention is paid to public transport workers who have been operating since long before the activation of BRT. Public transport drivers should be involved as they have been operating since before the presence of BRT, so that the presence of Mamminasata BRT does not pose a threat to their livelihoods and becomes a potential problem in the future. In the implementation of the policies of the BRT Mamminasata urban public transportation program, public transport drivers need to be further involved in the operations of BRT going forward so that the aspirations of the public transport drivers might be considered and prioritized.

Research organizations contain groups of experts, consultants, and academics specializing in the implementation of the common transport policy. They are involved in the policy process and actively provide input and solutions to the traffic jams and bottlenecks that occur in the city of Makassar as a whole. The news media serve as a medium for socialization and communication of the government program in transport policy as well as influence the public opinion. Even though mass media are limited to reporting on activities conducted by the central government and local government bodies (in this case the Department of Transportation, Communication, and Information), it nonetheless plays an active role in influencing public opinion. In addition to the institutional actors mentioned above, there are other actors involved in the process of BRT policy implementation and are, in fact, a direct target of these policies: the target group. The public serves as the target group (beneficiaries). The findings of this study indicate that the public, who are the target group of the BRT program, consists of users of public transport, specifically those who use the BRT daily such as school children, employees, traders, housewives and other members that utilize the service on a daily basis.

The author observed that each of these actors worked to sell their individual interests as if they were the main actor in BRT policy using their own methods. Ideally, all actors and institutions in a democratic and sustainable are involved in a dialog determining the burden (cost) and the benefits to be exchanged by each to maximize the effectiveness of the BRT Trans Mamminasata program. The reality is the government is still reliant on bureaucratic hierarchy to assert the obligations and the contributions of each level of government. Worse yet, the government has yet to initiate a democratic dialog to discuss and agree on appropriate compensation for public transportation that is relegated to a secondary pathway.

The idea of change in governance theory is referred to the principal of civic minimum. This principal states that, every citizen who wanted to share in social product have an obligation to make a proportional productive contribution and relevant towards community. Accentuation in exchange according to Bruni (2008), describe about the confession of heterogeneity, confessing that society moves when different people able to cooperate in many different ways. This thing could be implemented in the context of BRT policy, which means that BRT policy will be going well when the different stakeholders (interest group) are able to cooperate in many different ways.

Positive contributions as the form of exchange in city transportation policy with BRT mode in urban area Mamminasata cannot be get off from the legislation of land transportation. The constitution, which regulate the public transportation policy is the Constitution of Republic of Indonesia number 22, 2009 about traffic and road transportation. This constitution is the revision of constitution number 14,1992 about traffic and road transportation, which considered to not relevant to the current condition, strategic environmental change and the necessary of the enforcement of traffic and road transportation regulations.

In the constitution number 22, 2009 affirmed about the principle and objectives of the enforcement of traffic and road transportation. Principle of the enforcement consists of: transparency, accountability, sustainability, participative, benefit, efficiency and effectiveness, balance, comprehensive and independent.

In that constitution (above) reaffirmed about the instrument and accountability of traffic and road transportation enforcement. The direct service towards society is implemented by government, local government, legal entity, and/or society. However, the highest responsibility is on the state. The responsibility towards traffic and road transportation and its development are held by the government. Traffic and road transportation development consist of planning, regulating, controlling and supervising. According to those reaffirmation, the city transportation, principally, has economic mission, prosperity, nation development and law enforcement.

In BRT Trans Mamminasata policy, there are productive contributions which expected from state actors (government, South Sulawesi Province government, local government of Makassar City) and nonstate actors. These productive contributions is the form of the exchange principle (reciprocity) which the implementation of BRT Trans Mamminasata policy is expected to be effective. But, the
result of this research showing that the positive contributions from each actor is not determined by democratic dialogue as predicted by Durkheim [10]. The result of this research showing that the central government (ministry of transportation) as the main actor still depends on the hierarchy or bureaucratic flow/channel to deliver the decisions that have been made related to the priorities and objectives of BRT policy.

CONCLUSION
The South Sulawesi provincial government has yet to utilize institutionalized reciprocity with non-state actors. With regard to the BRT procurement program, the government is still reliant on hierarchal bureaucracy and formalized regulations. The central government (Ministry of Transportation) uses legislation to map funding for local governments. The government does not utilize institutionalized reciprocity at any level. The reciprocity in question is a dialog or contract that specifies the contributions and also the burden (cost) of all parties concerned. Involvement of stakeholders in the implementation of BRT program policies is not continuous. Lack of planning and involvement of stakeholders and government officers associated with BRT has caused the BRT program to be ineffective and inefficient.

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