JUPITER

JURNAL PERPUSTAKAAN, INFORMASI DAN KOMPUTER

Pelindung
Rektor Universitas Hasanuddin

Penasehat
Pembantu Rektor I UNHAS

Penanggung Jawab

Ketua Editor
Nurlaila Arief, SH;SIP

Editor
Jamaluddin, S. Sos ,MM.
La Tommeng, S. Sos, M. I. Kom.
Ir. Annis Assiri

Pimpinan Redaksi
Maria S. Sampe, S. Sos.

Wakil Pimpinan Redaksi
Andi Milu Marguna, S. Sos

Layout dan editing
Andi Nasri Abduh, S. Sos

Sekretaris Redaksi
Drs. Abdur Razaq

* Jupiter ini memuat artikel hasil penelitian dan artikel non penelitian (konsep tentang ilmu perpustakaan, dokumentasi, informasi dan computer) yang diterbitkan dengan frekuensi terbit Triwulan dalam setahun Bulan Maret, Juni, September dan Desember.

- Jupiter menerima, sumbangan tulisan hasil-hasil penelitian atau artikel non penelitian (konseptual) yang belum diterbitkan di media cetak lain.

* Naskah diketik dengan dua spasi pada kertas kuarto sebanyak 10-20 halaman, dan menyerahkan dalam bentuk CD, naskah yang masuk akan dievaluasi untuk ke-seragaman format tanpa merubah isinya.

Alamat redaksi

Gedung
UPT Perpustakaan Universitas Hasanuddin
UNHAS Tamalanrea,
Makassar 90245,
Telp. 580 068
Fax. 580 068
Website : WWW. Unhas.ac.id
E-mail Jurnal Jupiter@yahoo.com.
Makassar 90245
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@ Mengenal Budidaya Tanaman Kubis Bunga Broccoli</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andi Rousyani Amin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Dampak Pendidikan Bagi Masyarakat</td>
<td>11-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andi Haris</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Penataan Permukiman Kumuh Perkotaan Berbasisi Penataan Bangunan Dan</td>
<td>17-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lingkungan Syarif Beddu, M. Yahya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Pengendalian Silau Terhadap Kenyamanan Visual Dalam Ruang M.</td>
<td>27-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taufik Ishak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ American Foreign Policy Towards Iraq, Iran and North Korea</td>
<td>37-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniawati</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Influence of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation Towards Organizational Citizenship Behavior</td>
<td>44-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Akmal Ibrahim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Penetapan Kadar Air Pada Crude Palm Oil Dengan Cara Oven</td>
<td>55-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TerbukaKartanegara Ernawati Jassin dan Jumaliati</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Studi Pemanfaatan Limbah Cair Sawit Sistem Land Application</td>
<td>70-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilham Ahmad, Amiruddin Muhadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Karakteristik Alergen Pada Penderita Rinosinusitis di Makassar</td>
<td>85-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syahriljuita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Kompetensi dan Komitmen Aparat Dalam Rangka Meningkatkan Kinerja</td>
<td>100-114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelayanan Publik Baharuddin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@ Syarat Rekurensi Random Walk dimensi-1 Dalam Tinjauan Sebagai Rantai</td>
<td>115-122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markov Jusmawati Massalesse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ, IRAN AND NORTH KOREA: AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND NEOCONSERVATISM AGAINST THE AXIS OF EVIL

Oleh: Seniawati
Jurusan: Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik
Universitas Hasanuddin

National governments may be the most important actors in IR, but they are strongly influenced by a variety of nonstate actors. The terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the reshaping of the strategic landscape in the twenty-first century created complex challenges and dilemmas for the United States. The challenge came not only from within the established international order, but also from international terrorist (non-state actors).

Actually, as the twenty-first century began, the United States was the world’s sole superpower, with the world’s largest economy, most powerful military, and most influential social and cultural outlooks (O’Connor and Sabato, 2004: 784). Even so, it faced significant foreign and military policy challenges. The September 11, 2001, attacks magnified two challenges above all others, homeland defense and fighting a global war on terrorism. These two challenges required additional security measures at home, military action overseas, more cooperative intelligence with allies, coalition diplomacy with virtually everyone, and eliminating terrorist access to financial institutions.

President George Walker Bush through the promulgation of a broader approach to the issue of the state sponsorship of terrorism in his January 2002 State of the Union Address. In the wake of the liquidation of the Al Qaeda-sponsoring Taliban regime in Afghanistan through the successful completion of Operation Enduring Freedom the previous month, Bush used the address to impress upon those states with a history of support for terrorism that the United States would not tolerate such behavior. In particular, the president characterized three states (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) as members of “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Pauly, JR, and Lansford, 2005: 8). Furthermore, he referred explicitly to the threats posed by states determined to develop WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and maintain relationships with terrorists, including, but not limited to, bin Laden and his global network, concluding that Iraq, Iran and North Korea “pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic” (Pauly, JR, 2005: 6). Essentially, that address provided the rhetorical foundation for the planning and prosecution of the Second Iraq War.
The common principle of the “axis of evil” was that all three regimes were tyrannical, dangerous and illegitimate (Renshon and Suedfeld, 2007:4). What to do about them is quite another matter. President Bush has invaded Iraq, support six-nation talks with North Korea, and deferred to the European Union lead in referring Iran to the United Nations for its clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The reasons for the separate policies are to be found in their different strategic circumstances and the nature of the problem in each of the three countries.

According to Adam Quinn from University of Leicester (2008:44) most international relations (IR) theories concerned with power balancing would suggest that such a vision for the future, universal Great-Power cooperation under the auspices of American hegemonic power is ideologically confused and impracticable. The Bush strategy seems to suggest that common interests and values will overcome any temptation other powers have to balance against America. Yet the disputatious nature of the administration’s relations with most other powers throughout the implementation of its policy illustrates the vulnerability of any plan based on such an assumption.

This research is based on Bush’s administration towards “axis of evil” countries. The Bush administration to describe “the policy that nations harboring terrorists would be treated as if they were guilty of terrorist acts” (Renshon and Suedfeld, 2007:39). The United States appealed to arguments which suggested its actions, by addressing a real threat centering
on WMD and terrorism, furthered the common interest of all the Great Power. In practice, however, almost all those power lined up to criticize and obstruct American effort to assemble a coalition for invasion. This highlighted an age-old, perhaps inherent, problem at the heart of any agenda based on the pursuit of assumedly common interests: the national interests, while they may be asserted, in the language of generalities, to be common, cannot be defined with sufficient objectivity to guarantee agreement on policy in concrete cases. Hence a nation may find itself unilaterally acting to defend, as it argues it, the interests of other powers, through actions which those very same powers themselves oppose. As U.S. policy twisted itself into this precarious ideological poise, the Iraq debate inevitably became concentrated not on the shared values and interests of all nations but on the undesirable qualities of American hegemony.

The new world order and the new war have created a great deal about the meaning of US policy and national (grand) strategy. Palmer noted:

The term “strategy,” derived from the ancient Greek, originally pertained to the art of generalship or high command. In modern times, “grand strategy” has come into use to describe the overall defense plans of a nation or coalition of nations. Since the midtwentieth century, “national strategy” has attained wide usage, meaning the coordinated employment of the total resources of a nation to achieve its national objectives (Sarkesian and Connor, JR. 2006:122).

But other definition, the strategy insisted that:

Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threat, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries choice of weapons, do...
not permit that option.

We cannot let our enemies strike first (Bellamy, etc., 2008:117).

Grand strategy is the usual label
given to the way a state intends to pursue
its national interest.

From this a number of other strategies are
designed that are focused on specific
region or issues. Thus, there is military
strategy, economic strategy, political
strategy, psychological strategy. Policy
refers to goals, strategy is the means to
reach these goals.

US national interest are
expressions of major US policy objectives
projected into the international arena.

We must recognize that
America does indeed have
national interests in the world,
including an extremely
important interest in the sturdy
legitimacy of the international
system as it change over
time...This does not imply that
American global hegemony is
needed now or in the future as
it was needed to deal with the
global Soviet military threat
throughout the Cold War.
Instead, we need to be both
precise and clear about our
national interests as the twin
military and geopolitical
transformations remake the
international order (Sarkesian

The purpose of these interest
includes the creation and perpetuation of
an international environment that is not
inimical (antagonistic) to the peaceful
pursuit of American values. It follows that
such interests are those that nurture and
expand democracy and open systems.
Conversely, these interests are those that
prevent the expansion of closed system
using force or indirect aggressive means.
But all national interests do not
automatically translate into vital interests
and therefore into a national security
concern that is, a situation where military
involvement must be contemplated and
perhaps undertaken.

As stated, at the core of US
national interest is the survival of the
homeland and the American political
order. But survival cannot be limited to the
final defense of the homeland. In light of
today's weapons technology, ideological
imperatives and international terrorism,
among other things, the concept of survival
of the homeland means more than
retreating to the borders of the United
States and threatening total destruction of
any who attack.

If national interest is invoked only
in those cases where the homeland is
directly threatened and its survival is at
stake, then the concept is of little use.
Indeed, it may be too late if Americans
wait until survival is at stake. If the
concept of national security is to have any
meaning in terms of policy and strategy,
then it must mean something more than
survival of the American homeland. It is
interpretation and application of this
broader view that spark a great deal of
debate and disagreement between the
Executive and Legislative branches of
government and between a variety of
groups in the American political arena, including the media.

A useful way to try to distinguish the various elements in the concept of national interests is to view these from the perspective of priorities: core (first order), contiguous (second order) and outer (third order). In the concept of new war following 9/11 the distinction between these various interests has considerably blurred. Third order interests may at some point move quickly into first-order interests as international terrorists as well as non-state actors are seen as immediate challenges to US national interests. Many point to the US invasion of Iraq as an example of such a phenomenon.

**First Order: vital interests**

Protection of the homeland, and areas and issues directly affecting this priority, requires a total military mobilization and resource commitment of the nation's total effort. Now this also includes homeland security and increasingly involves private security firms as well as National Guard and Reserve forces.

**Second Order: Critical Interests**

These are areas and interests that do not directly affect the country's survival, but in the long run have a high propensity for becoming first-order priorities. In the immediate period, these have a direct influence on first order priorities. Such interests are measured primarily by the degree to which they maintain, nurture and expand open systems. Military force may be the instrument of choice, but not necessarily the only instrument.

**Third Order: Serious Interests**

These are areas and issues that do not seriously affect first- and second-order interests, but do cast some shadow over such interests. US efforts are focused on creating favorable conditions to preclude such issues from developing into higher-order ones. Unfavorable third-order interests serve as a warning to second-order interests. A variety of non-military instruments are probably the most appropriate (Sarkesian and Connor, JR, 2006:122).

All other interests are peripheral in that they are placed on a watch list. This means there is no immediate impact on any order of interests, but these matters should be watched in case events raise them to a higher order. In the meantime, these peripheral interests require few if any US resources. Nonetheless, as 9/11 showed, peripheral interests can quickly become first order interests. This requires close and reasonably accurate intelligence assessments of the strategic landscape in the current period.

American values as they apply to the external world are at the core of national interests. National interests do not mean that US strategy is limited to the immediate homeland of the United States. These require power projection into various parts of the world. National interests and national security are closely linked. But these interests must be differentiated in terms of vital (core) and other interests. This should be the critical aspect of national security.
The president is the focal point in defining and articulating American national interests because president is the dominant actor in American foreign policy (Janda, dkk, 2000:669). To do this effectively, the President must demonstrate leadership and understanding of the domestic and international setting. There must be a degree of consensus between the American public and national leaders regarding when national interests demand the use of military force.

All other interests are peripheral in what they place on a worksheet. The immediate issue is no immediate impact on only one order of interests, but those interests pointing to a higher order in the matrix. Those interests can quickly become their peripheral interests reduce low in any US security strategy, whereas national security can directly become their other interests. This reduces the intelligence assessments of the strategic landscape in the conical portfolio.

American values as they apply to the current world view, the concept of national interests, national interests do not mean that US interests is limited to the immediate homeland of the United States. These include other interests, human influence into various parts of the world. National interests and national interests that are difficult to measure in terms of military force can be the critical aspect of national security.
References

Book
Pauly, JR., Robert J. and Tom Lansford, 2005, Strategic Pre-emption: US Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War, Ashgate Publishing, USA.

Journal