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LAMPIRAN

Lampiran 1. Pengelompokan Butir Perjanjian Minsk I dalam Konsep 3P

Pengelompokan Butir Perjanjian Minsk I dalam Konsep 3P			
Butir Perjanjian Minsk I	<i>Peacekeeping</i>	<i>Peacemaking</i>	<i>Peacebuilding</i>
Memastikan gencatan senjata secara bilateral sesegera mungkin		✓	
Memastikan pemantauan dan verifikasi gencatan senjata oleh OSCE		✓	
Desentralisasi kekuasaan, termasuk melalui adopsi undang-undang Ukraina " <i>On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts</i> "		✓	
Memastikan pemantauan permanen perbatasan Ukraina-Rusia dan verifikasi oleh OSCE dengan penciptaan zona keamanan di wilayah perbatasan Ukraina dan Federasi Rusia		✓	
Pembebasan semua sandera dan orang-orang yang ditahan secara ilegal sesegera mungkin		✓	
Undang-undang yang mencegah penuntutan dan penghukuman terhadap orang-orang sehubungan dengan peristiwa yang terjadi di beberapa daerah di Donetsk dan Luhansk		✓	
Melanjutkan dialog nasional yang inklusif		✓	✓
Mengambil langkah-langkah untuk memperbaiki situasi kemanusiaan di Donbas		✓	✓
Memastikan pemilihan umum lokal yang lebih awal sesuai dengan hukum Ukraina " <i>On</i>			✓

<i>temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts"</i>			
Menarik kelompok-kelompok bersenjata ilegal dan peralatan militer serta para pejuang dan tentara bayaran dari wilayah Ukraina		✓	
Mengadopsi program pemulihan dan rekonstruksi ekonomi untuk wilayah Donbas			✓
Memberikan keamanan pribadi bagi peserta dalam konsultasi		✓	

Sumber: Data diolah Penulis

Lampiran 2. Pengelompokan Butir Perjanjian Follow-up memorandum

Minsk I dalam Konsep 3P

Pengelompokan Butir <i>Follow-up</i> Memorandum Minsk I dalam Konsep 3P			
Butir <i>Follow-up</i> Memorandum	<i>Peacekeeping</i>	<i>Peacemaking</i>	<i>Peacebuilding</i>
Melarang penerbangan pesawat tempur di atas zona keamanan		✓	
Menarik semua tentara bayaran asing dari zona konflik		✓	
Melarang operasi ofensif		✓	
Menarik persenjataan berat sejauh 15 kilometer (9,3 mil) ke belakang di setiap sisi garis kontak, menciptakan <i>buffer zone</i> sejauh 30 kilometer (19 mil)		✓	
Menugaskan <i>OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine</i> untuk memantau pelaksanaan Protokol Minsk.		✓	✓

Sumber: Data diolah oleh Penulis

Lampiran 3. Pengelompokan Butir Perjanjian Minsk II dalam Konsep 3P

Pengelompokan Butir Memorandum Minsk II dalam Konsep 3P			
Butir Perjanjian Minsk II	<i>Peacekeeping</i>	<i>Peacemaking</i>	<i>Peacebuilding</i>
Gencatan senjata segera dan penuh di distrik-distrik tertentu di Donetsk dan Luhansk, Ukraina, dan pelaksanaannya secara ketat mulai pukul 00:00 tengah malam waktu EET pada tanggal 15 Februari 2015		✓	
Penarikan semua senjata berat oleh kedua belah pihak pada jarak yang sama dengan tujuan menciptakan zona keamanan dengan jarak minimal 50 kilometer (31 mil) untuk artileri kaliber 100 mm atau lebih dan zona keamanan 70 kilometer (43 mil) untuk beberapa peluncur roket (MRLS) dan 140 kilometer (87 mil) untuk MLRS Tornado-S, Uragan, Smerch, dan Tochka U <i>tactical missile systems</i> : a. untuk pasukan Ukraina, dari garis kontak yang sebenarnya; b. untuk formasi bersenjata dari distrik-distrik tertentu di Donetsk dan Luhansk, Ukraina, dari garis kontak sesuai dengan Memorandum Minsk pada tanggal 19 September 2014 Penarikan senjata berat yang disebutkan di atas harus dimulai selambat-lambatnya pada hari kedua setelah dimulainya gencatan senjata dan selesai dalam waktu 14 hari. Proses ini akan dibantu oleh OSCE dengan dukungan dari <i>TCG on Ukraine</i> .		✓	
Pemantauan dan verifikasi yang efektif terhadap rezim gencatan		✓	

<p>senjata dan penarikan senjata berat oleh OSCE akan dilakukan sejak hari pertama penarikan senjata dengan menggunakan semua sarana teknis yang diperlukan seperti satelit, <i>drone</i>, sistem <i>radio-location</i>, dan lain-lain.</p>			
<p>Pada hari pertama setelah gencatan, sebuah dialog akan dimulai mengenai modalitas pelaksanaan pemilihan umum lokal sesuai dengan undang-undang Ukraina dan hukum Ukraina "<i>On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts</i>" dan juga mengenai masa depan distrik-distrik tersebut berdasarkan hukum yang disebutkan di atas. Tanpa penundaan, tetapi tidak lebih dari 30 hari sejak tanggal penandatanganan dokumen ini, sebuah resolusi harus disetujui oleh <i>Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine</i> (Dewan Tertinggi Ukraina) yang menunjukkan wilayah yang berada di bawah rezim khusus sesuai dengan hukum "<i>On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts</i>" berdasarkan garis yang ditetapkan oleh Memorandum Minsk pada tanggal 19 September 2014</p>		<p>✓</p>	<p>✓</p>
<p>Memberikan pengampunan dan amnesti dengan cara memberlakukan undang-undang yang melarang penganiayaan dan penghukuman terhadap orang-orang sehubungan dengan peristiwa-peristiwa yang terjadi di distrik-distrik tertentu di Donetsk dan Luhansk, Ukraina</p>		<p>✓</p>	

Menyediakan pembebasan dan pertukaran semua sandera dan orang-orang yang ditahan secara ilegal berdasarkan prinsip " <i>all for all.</i> " Proses ini harus berakhir – paling lambat – pada hari kelima setelah penarikan (senjata)		✓	
Menyediakan akses yang aman, pengiriman, penyimpanan, dan distribusi bantuan kemanusiaan kepada mereka yang membutuhkan berdasarkan mekanisme internasional			✓
Mendefinisikan modalitas pemulihan penuh hubungan sosial dan ekonomi, termasuk transfer sosial seperti pembayaran pensiun dan pembayaran lainnya (penghasilan dan pendapatan, pembayaran tagihan komunal secara tepat waktu, pemulihan pembayaran pajak dalam kerangka kerja bidang hukum Ukraina). Dengan tujuan ini, Ukraina akan memulihkan manajemen atas segmen sistem perbankannya di distrik-distrik yang terkena dampak konflik, dan mungkin, mekanisme internasional akan dibentuk untuk memudahkan transaksi tersebut			✓
Mengembalikan kontrol perbatasan negara kepada pemerintah Ukraina di seluruh wilayah konflik yang harus dimulai pada hari pertama setelah pemilihan umum lokal dan berakhir setelah peraturan politik penuh (pemilihan umum lokal di distrik-distrik tertentu di oblast Donetsk dan Luhansk berdasarkan hukum Ukraina dan reformasi konstitusional) pada akhir tahun 2015 dengan syarat terpenuhinya Butir ke-11 –		✓	

melalui konsultasi dan kesepakatan dengan wakil-wakil distrik-distrik tertentu di oblast Donetsk dan Luhansk dalam <i>framework TCG on Ukraine</i>			
Penarikan semua formasi bersenjata asing, peralatan militer, dan juga tentara bayaran dari wilayah Ukraina di bawah pengawasan OSCE. Perlucutan senjata semua kelompok ilegal		✓	
Reformasi konstitusional di Ukraina dengan konstitusi baru yang akan diberlakukan pada akhir tahun 2015 yang elemen kuncinya adalah desentralisasi (dengan mempertimbangkan keistimewaan-keistimewaan distrik-distrik tertentu di Oblast Donetsk dan Luhansk, yang telah disetujui oleh para perwakilan distrik-distrik tersebut) serta persetujuan legislasi permanen atas status khusus distrik-distrik tertentu di Oblast Donetsk dan Luhansk sesuai dengan langkah-langkah yang telah diuraikan di dalam catatan kaki terlampir, pada akhir tahun 2015			✓
Berdasarkan Undang-Undang Ukraina " <i>On temporary Order of Local Self-Governance in Particular Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts,</i> " pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang berkaitan dengan pemilihan umum lokal akan dibahas dan disepakati dengan perwakilan dari daerah-daerah tertentu di Oblast Donetsk dan Luhansk dalam <i>framework TCG on Ukraine</i> . Pemilu akan diselenggarakan sesuai dengan standar OSCE yang relevan dan dipantau oleh OSCE/ODIHR (<i>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</i>).			✓

Mengintensifkan <i>TCG on Ukraine</i> termasuk melalui pembentukan kelompok-kelompok kerja untuk implementasi aspek-aspek yang relevan dari Perjanjian Minsk. Kelompok-kelompok ini akan mencerminkan komposisi <i>TCG on Ukraine</i>		✓	✓
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Sumber: Data diolah oleh Penulis